Against Feasibility Analysis
Jonathan S. Masurt & EricA. Posnertt
Feasibility analysis, a method of evaluating government regulations,has emerged
as the majoralternative to cost-benefit analysis.Although regulatory agencies have used
feasibility analysis (in some contexts called "technology-based" analysis) longer than
cost-benefit analysis,feasibility analysis has received far less attention in the scholarly
literature.In recent years; however, critics of cost-benefit analysis have offered feasibility
analysis as a superior alternative. We advance the debate by uncovering the analytic
structure of feasibility analysis and its normative premises, and then criticizing them.
Our account builds on two examples of feasibility analysis, one conducted by OSHA
and the other by EPA. We find that feasibility analysis leads to both under- and overregulation, and we conclude that it lacks a normative justification and should have no
place in government regulation.

INTRODUCTION

Feasibility analysis, a method of evaluating government regulations, has emerged as the major alternative to cost-benefit analysis
(CBA). A regulation satisfies feasibility analysis if it reduces a risk of
harm to the maximum extent possible without having a major negative impact on the economy such as "widespread plant closings."' By
contrast, a regulation satisfies CBA if it produces benefits (in terms of
deaths, injuries, and other losses avoided) greater than the cost of
compliance. Although agencies have used feasibility analysis (in some
contexts, called "technology-based" analysis) longer than CBA, feasibility analysis has received far less attention in the scholarly literature.
In recent years, however, critics of CBA have offered feasibility analysis as a superior alternative. The dispute over these standards will car-
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environmental law).
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ry over into the Obama administration,' and for that reason a critical
assessment of the feasibility standard is long overdue.
When Congress authorizes agencies to regulate, it occasionally
provides detailed instructions but more typically issues vague standards. These standards appear in numerous different formulations, but
most statutes fall into two groups. In the first, Congress directs the
agency to reduce a risk to the extent "feasible," or to the "maximum"
extent, with no mention of costs. For example, the Occupational Safety
and Health Act requires the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) secretary to ensure, "to the extent feasible," that
exposure to hazards in the workplace does not harm workers' health.'
In the second, Congress directs the agency to consider the costs as
well as the benefits of risk reduction. For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to consider "all relevant aspects of the risk ... [and] a compari-

son of the estimated costs of complying with actions taken under this
chapter."' Agencies tend to use feasibility analysis for the first category of statutes and CBA for the second category of statutes, though it is
by no means clear that they are legally obligated to do so, and there
are some exceptions and mixed cases. Courts have afforded agencies
significant latitude under the Chevron doctrine.
3
See, for example, Cass Sunstein, Risk and Reason 5-9 (Cambridge 2004) (arguing that a
cost-benefit model of regulation can protect health and extend lives by identifying means that
simple intuition might neglect). President Barack Obama has nominated (and the Senate has
confirmed) Cass Sunstein, a prominent defender of CBA, to head the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). See Bernie Becker, Senate Confirms Regulatory Chief, NY Times
(Sept 10, 2009), online at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/senate-confirmsregulatory-chief (visited Nov 15,2009) (noting that Sunstein was approved by a vote of 57-40 on
September 10, 2009). 'IWo prominent critics, Lisa Heinzerling and Chris Schroeder, have been
appointed to positions in EPA and the Justice Department, respectively. Both Heinzerling and
Schroeder have endorsed feasibility analysis. See Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretationin the
Era of OIRA, 33 Fordham Urban L J 1097,1097 (2006) (arguing that regulation under the Clean
Water Act must be subjected to "technology-based" analysis rather than CBA); Sidney A. Shapi-

ro and Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A PragmaticReorientation, 32

Harv Envir L Rev 433,479-80 (2008) (arguing that a pragmatic approach to regulatory analysis
is more consistent with technology-based regulation than a "CBA-centered" approach, as the
regulation requires "the most protection achievable by current technologies unless 'costs are
disruptive or extraordinary'").
4
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 6, Pub L No 91-596, 84 Stat 1590, 1593,
codified at 29 USC § 655(b)(5).
5
Toxic Substances Control Act § 6, Pub L No 94-469,90 Stat 2003,2020 (1976), codified at
15 USC § 2605(c)(1).
6
See Chevron US.A. Inc v NRDC, 467 US 837, 865-66 (1984) (allowing agencies discretion in their construction of regulations when Congress, "inadvertently" or "intentionally," has
left left some matters of interpretation unresolved). For an example of the Court affording an
agency considerable latitude, see generally, for example, Entergy Corp v Riverkeeper,Inc, 129 S
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In 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order requiring agencies to use CBA for major regulations. His successors
through President George W. Bush have issued similar orders;' President Barack Obama has not yet acted. The executive orders do not
require agencies to use CBA in violation of statutory mandates, so
their effect has been to more sharply bifurcate agency practice. Agencies applying statutes that permit them to consider costs have, since
1981, applied CBA more rigorously and systematically. Agencies applying statutes that do not permit them to compare costs and benefits,
or that permit them to do so in a fashion that falls short of CBA, now
report cost-benefit analyses of their regulations, but they do not follow
these analyses and instead continue to use feasibility analysis to guide
regulatory decisionmaking.
President Reagan's executive order unleashed an enormous literature on CBA. The debate continues to this day. Defenders argue
that CBA produces better regulations, enhances transparency, and
brings rigor to the regulatory process.! Critics argue that CBA has
weak normative foundations and, in practice, forces agencies to ignore
real but difficult-to-monetize regulatory benefits, resulting in underregulation of the environment, the workplace, and other domains.0 Until
Ct 1498 (2009) (allowing EPA to use CBA under a section of the Clean Water Act requiring the
use of the "best technology available").
7
Executive Order 12291, 46 Fed Reg 13193 (1981).
8 Executive Order 12866,58 Fed Reg 51735 (1993).
9 Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit
Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health 12-13 (Oxford 2008) (arguing that

CBA makes decisionmakers more accountable for their decisions, gives taxpayers a more accurate sense of the costs of regulation, and imposes structure on an otherwise discretionary
process); Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, New Foundationsof Cost-Benefit Analysis 100

(Harvard 2006) (comparing CBA's expected impact on overall welfare with the expected impact
of other decision procedures); Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U Chi L Rev 1021, 1041-47 (2004) (arguing that CBA has advanced the
"overall understanding of social policies and regulations" by providing a systematic way to compare different types of regulations and by making the process more transparent); Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State: The Future of Regulatory Protection 6-10 (ABA 2002) (arguing that

CBA results in more targeted regulations, more government resistance to demands for regulation
that have their foundations in emotional reactions, and more exposure of the consequences of
regulation to public view); Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental,Health,
and Safety Regulation: A Statement of Principles 1-2 (AEl 1996), online at http-//www.aei-

brooking&orgladmin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=203 (visited Nov 15, 2009) (encouraging the use of
CBA when making major regulatory decisions or setting regulatory priorities, and arguing against
statutory restrictions on its use, such as those found in the Clean Air Act).
1o David M. Driesen, Douglas A. Kysar, and Amy Sinden, Cost-Benefit Analysis: New

Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 Reg & Governance 48, 55-56 (2009) (criticizing the application
of CBA to regulations involving the value of human life or the benefit of environmental protection rules); Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless:On Knowing the Price of Everything
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recently, the critics have never been very clear about what decision
procedure they prefer to CBA. But feasibility analysis has become
their white knight. They argue that feasibility analysis rests on a
stronger normative foundation than CBA does, and is just as rigorous
and transparent."

and the Value of Nothing 7-12 (New Press 2004); Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing
the Priceless:Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection,150 U Pa L Rev 1553, 1578-81

(2002) (arguing that CBA neglects unquantifiable health and environmental benefits of regulation and tends to overstate the costs of implementation); Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis:
An Ethical Critique,5 Reg 33, 35-38 (Jan/Feb 1981) (arguing as an ethical matter that a regulation may be advisable even where its benefits do not outweigh its costs and that certain nonmarketed goods, such as human life and fresh-smelling air, should not be priced in dollar terms). A
recent white paper signed by several law professors expressed concern about Cass Sunstein's
appointment to OIRA because of his support for CBA and regulatory centralization. See John S.
Applegate, et al, Reinvigorating Protection of Health, Safety, and the Environment: The Choices

Facing Cass Sunstein 1 (white paper, Jan 2009), online at http://www.progressivereform.org/
articles/SunsteinOIRA90l.pdf (visited Nov 15, 2009) (arguing that CBA is "neither sound in theory
nor useful in practice" and advocating that OIRA stop conducting centralized review of regulations).
11 Driesen, Kysar, and Sinden, 3 Reg & Governance at 63-66 (cited in note 10) (arguing
that feasibility analysis should be regarded as a welfarist procedure on par with or superior to
CBA because, in addition to weighing costs, it "more comprehensively considers aspects of welfare that are central to environmental regulation" but not as amenable to quantification); Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 1-3 (cited in note 1) (arguing that feasibility analysis reflects an
accounting for costs and comports better with democratic theory by shifting responsibility from
agencies to Congress); Ackerman and Heinzerling, Pricelessat 205-07 (cited in note 10) (defending technology-based standards of the Clean Air Act); Lisa Heinzerling and Rena I. Steinzor, A
Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration,Part11, 34 Envir L Rep 10485,10486 (2004)

(arguing that EPA must employ feasibility analysis); Sidney A. Shapiro and Robert L. Glicksman, Risk Regulation at Risk: Restoring a PragmaticApproach 61-65 (Stanford 2003) (arguing

that the current system of regulation is more effective than CBA at "accommodating important
noneconomic social values with the goal of economic efficiency"); Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards,2000 U Ill L Rev 83,92-107 (arguing that feasibility analysis, in the form of technology-based standards, satisfies a "moral imperative" of environmental
law and makes regulations more expeditious to promulgate, and more enforceable, predictable,
even-handed, and adaptable);'ihomas 0. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy 142-59, 305 (Cambridge 1991) (arguing that CBA

presents intractable valuation problems that may conceal biases and concluding that CBA alone
cannot resolve policy questions in most regulatory contexts); Sidney A. Shapiro and Thomas 0.
McGarity, Not So Paradoxical:The Rationale For Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 Duke L J

729, 739-44 (criticizing the distributional consequences of implementing cost-benefit standards,
and noting that "the cost-benefit approach creates too many uncompensated losers when compared with technology-based approaches"); Frank B. Cross, Environmentally Induced Cancer and
the Law 90-92 (Quorum 1989) (arguing that feasibility analysis is more certain than CBA, since
it does not rely so heavily on risk assessment, and less morally problematic, because it does not
attempt to place a value on human life). See also Shapiro and Schroeder, 32 Harv Envir L Rev at
483-84 (cited in note 3) (proposing a type of "pragmatic" risk analysis largely consistent with
feasibility analysis); Daniel A. Farber, Eco-Pragmatism Making Sensible Environmental Deci-

sions in an Uncertain World 116 (Chicago 1999) (proposing a reconciliation of CBA and feasibility analysis that combines elements of each).
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There is an earlier literature from the 1980s and 1990s that criticized environmental regulation that relied on technology-based standards-a quasi-synonym for feasibility analysis. However, this literature had a different focus from the current debate." Then, critics argued that EPA's regulations were costly and inefficient because command-and-control regulation fails to exploit market incentives.'3 The
criticism led to proposals that cap-and-trade systems and similar market-based mechanisms be used," and to endorsement in some quarters
of CBA." But the critics never addressed feasibility analysis on its own
terms. It may well have been that EPA never applied the test appropriately rather than that the test was flawed.
Part of the problem was no doubt that the feasibility test had never
been given a clear account. What does it mean to say that an agency
must reduce a risk to the point at which "widespread plant closings"
occur? Can this term be given a precise definition? And why exactly are
widespread plant closings to be avoided? These questions have not received clear answers, with the result that the debate has proceeded in a
cloud of ambiguity. We try to advance the debate by uncovering the
analytic structure of feasibility analysis and its normative premises, and
then criticizing them." Our account builds on two examples of feasibility analysis, one conducted by OSHA and the other by EPA." We con12 See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 Stan L Rev 1333, 1335-37, 1341-47 (1985) (criticizing "best available technology" standards, but focusing on the transaction costs involved in their administration rather than addressing flaws inherent to feasibility anaylsis).
13 Id.
14 See, for example, id at 1341-47.
Is See, for example, Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 271-84 (Harvard 1982)
(defending the use of CBA in regulation).
16 Others have criticized feasibility analysis, usually on the grounds that it is vague. See, for
example, Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State at 73-75 (cited in note 9). But as defenders have
pointed out, all decision procedures, including CBA, have this problem, at least to some extent.
Other critics have addressed the record of the use of feasibility analysis by agencies. See, for
example, Ackerman and Stewart, 37 Stan L Rev at 1334-35 (cited in note 12) (noting that the
regulation systems in place have resulted in the waste of billions of dollars each year). We focus
instead on its analytic and normative foundations. Although a number of sources have touched
on this issue, none has been comprehensive. We cite them as appropriate below.
17 These examples are only two of many that have been issued over the years. We have not
tried to do a survey, but we chose these two because they seem representative and are relatively
clear. After the EPA regulation we discuss was issued, EPA issued guidelines on its regulatory
approach, including its use of feasibility analysis. These guidelines are consistent with the approach
that it used in the regulation that we examine, and subsequent regulations seem largely consistent

with it as well. See generally EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses (Sept 2000), online

at http:Hyosemite.epa.gov/ee/epaleed.nsf/webpages/Guidelines.html/$file/Guidelines.pdf
Nov 15, 2009).
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clude that feasibility analysis lacks a normative justification and should
have no place in government regulation.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Feasibility analysis is not a single statutory standard, nor is it a
single, consistent methodology. Rather, feasibility analysis is a term
that encompasses a spectrum of agency practices taken under the ambit of a wide variety of statutory mandates. All of these statutes by
their plain terms appear to demand some type of stringent health or
safety regulation that does not rely on calculations of costs and benefits. In the Parts that follow, we describe the legal apparatus surrounding feasibility analysis in some detail.
A. Statutory Framework
When Congress regulates an environmental or workplace hazard,
it frequently does so on a technological or results-oriented basis. That
is, Congress often mandates the installation of a particular level of
pollution-controlling technology, or more generally it requires that an
agency achieve a particular level of safety with respect to some hazard.
The level of technology or the result sought is frequently described in
vague terms by Congress, leaving the agency with ample interpretive
authority. Nonetheless, many of these statutory mandates share a common feature: they require the most protective or restrictive level of pollution or hazard control possible, subject only to modest limitations. For
instance, one section of the Clean Air Act requires that polluters install
the "best available control technology" with the goal of achieving the
"maximum degree of reduction" of regulated air pollutants." At the
same time, these statutes do not explicitly require a comparison of costs
and benefits. Rather, regulated industries are directed to install a type
of technology or achieve a level of safety whose benefits are left unspecified. The limitations placed on the technology are occasionally
couched in terms of costs, 9 but are more frequently left in more demanding (if vaguer) terms -for instance, "best availabletechnology.",'
Scholars have argued that these statutes call for "feasibility analysis," a term borrowed from the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
42 USC § 7475(a)(4). See also 42 USC §7479(3).
19 See, for example, 42 USC § 7412(d)(2) (mandating the "maximum degree of reduction ...
achievable... taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction .... ").
20 See, for example, 42 USC §4916(a)(1) (mandating that noise emission standards for railroads be based on the application of the "best available technology" for reducing noise emission).
18
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which protects workplace safety "to the extent feasible."2' According
to these scholars, an agency regulating under one of these statutory
provisions should not engage in CBA. Rather, it should examine only
whether a particular level of regulation is technologically and economically feasible: whether the technological means exist to implement the regulation, and whether the regulation will cause significant
economic harm to the regulated industry, to the point of triggering
"widespread plant shutdowns."" Only regulations that would threaten
to bankrupt a large segment of the affected industry are barred under
feasibility analysis.2 According to this conception of feasibility analysis, an agency cannot select a less stringent regulatory standard
(among several options) when the more stringent option would not
lead to plant shutdowns." It is thus unsurprising that feasibility analysis has generally been regarded as favoring strong regulation, in comparison to CBA.
At the same time, the general heading of "feasibility analysis"
masks wide variation among both statutory mandates and actual
agency practices. In later Parts we examine the ways in which OSHA
and EPA actually perform feasibility analysis. Here, we canvass several of the most important statutory phrases that are understood to trigger some version of feasibility analysis. In order to provide a standard
for comparison, we also highlight several statutes that appear to call
for something closer to CBA.
1. Workplace safety.
The term "feasibility analysis" derives from the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, which instructs OSHA to set the standard
"which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible ... that no em-

ployee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capaci21

29 USC § 655(b)(5).

Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 2-3 (cited in note 1). See also Shapiro and Schroeder,
32 Harv Envir L Rev at 483-84 (cited in note 3); Heinzerling, 33 Fordham Urban L J at 1102 n 37
(cited in note 3).
United Steelworkers of America v Marshall, 647 F2d 1189, 1272 (DC Cir 1980) ("[A]s for
2
economic feasibility, OSHA must construct a reasonable estimate of compliance costs and demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that these costs will not threaten the existence or competitive
structure of an industry, even if it does portend disaster for some marginal firms.").
24 Public Citizen Health Research Group v Tyson, 796 F2d 1479, 1505-06 (DC Cir 1986)
(holding that OSHA's guiding statute compels it to act if a regulation would reduce a significant
health risk and would be feasible to implement and finding that OSHA had failed to support its
decision not to issue a regulatory limitation on that basis); Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 17
(cited in note 1) (noting that an agency cannot "forego an environmental improvement with
costs too insignificant to produce closures").
22
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ty."' That standard must be "reasonably necessary or appropriate to
provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment."6
On its face, "most adequately assures, to the extent feasible" reads as
though the full extent of costs and benefits are largely irrelevant. The
regulator is to require a safety measure, as long as the measure is
"feasible." "[R]easonably necessary ... to provide safe or healthful

employment" appears to incorporate some measure of the benefits
provided, but without any directive to balance them against costs.
Similarly, the Mine Act instructs the Secretary of Labor to "set
standards which most adequately assure on the basis of the best available evidence that no miner will suffer material impairment of health
or functional capacity."27 That section notes that "[i]n addition to the
attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for
the miner, other considerations shall be ... the feasibility of the stan-

dards."" This statute, like the safety and health statute, makes no mention of compliance costs.
2. Environmental protection.
Environmental statutes involve an extensive array of verbal formulations, some of which appear to trigger feasibility analysis and
others of which call for an approach more akin to CBA.
a) Best available technology. The Clean Air Act's National Am-

bient Air Quality Standards and Prevention of Significant Deterioration programs instruct EPA to require that each new pollutionemitting facility employ "the best available control technology for
each pollutant."" The Clean Air Act elsewhere defines "best available
control technology" to mean a technology that will provide "the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant ... which the permitting

authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is
achievable for such facility." 3 Similarly, the New Source provisions of
the Clean Air Act set as EPA's regulatory goal "the degree of emission
29 USC § 655(b)(5) (requiring "the highest degree of health and safety protection for
2
the employee," taking into account "available scientific data," "the feasibility of the standards,"
and "experience gained" under existing health and safety laws).
26 29 USC §652(8).
27 Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 § 201, Pub L No 95-164, 91 Stat 1290, 1291,
codified at 30 USC § 811(a)(6)(A).
28

Id.

42 USC § 7475(a)(4) (putting forward requirements for the construction of new major
emitting facilities).
3
42 USC § 7479(3).
29
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limitation achievable through the application of the best system of
emission reduction ... (taking into account the cost of achieving such
reduction ... )."" Here, as with OSHA, the objective is stated in categor-

ical terms ("maximum degree of reduction"), and while the statute references economic costs, regulation is subject only to the limitation that
those reductions be "achievable." As proponents of feasibility analysis
have noted, the most straightforward way of achieving the maximum
degree of reduction of a particular pollutant is to simply close down
every factory that creates it. 2 In that sense, proponents of feasibility
analysis view the principle that regulation must not trigger widespread
bankruptcies as a concession to practical economic realities."
Similarly, portions of the Clean Water Act require the use of "the
best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact,"" while others "require application of the best available technology economically achievable for [each applicable] category or class""
or the "greatest degree of effluent reduction which the Administrator
determines to be achievable through application of the best available
demonstrated control technology."6 Like the Clean Air Act, however,
these statutory provisions are not silent on matters of costs. When regulating pursuant to these statutes, EPA must "take into consideration
the cost of achieving" reductions in water pollution." At the same
time, categorical insistence upon the "best available technology," subject only to the consideration that it be "economically achievable" (or
that the agency merely "consider" costs), has led sympathetic observers to conclude that the statute demands feasibility analysis, rather
than CBA.
42 USC § 7411(a)(1).
Union Electric Co v EPA, 427 US 246, 265 & n 14 (1976) (remarking that "[i]n a literal
sense, of course, no plan is infeasible since offending sources always have the option of shutting
down" if the proposed regulation is too stringent); AFL-CIO v Brennan, 530 F2d 109,118 n 26,
121 (3d Cir 1975) (discussing the prohibitive costs of the "no hands in dies" standard for mechanical power presses, and stating that while "[u]ndoubtably the most certain way to eliminate industrial hazards is to eliminate industry," the Occupational Safety and Health Act was intended
to improve working conditions, not eliminate them altogether); Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev
at 10 (cited in note 1).
33 See, for example, Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 10 (cited in note 1).
34 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 ("Clean Water Act"), Pub L
No 92-500,86 Stat 816,876, codified at 33 USC § 1326(b).
35
33 USC § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i).
36 33 USC § 1316(a)(1).
37 33 USC § 1316(b)(1)(B).
38 See, for example, Heinzerling, 33 Fordham Urban L J at 1106-13 (cited in note 3) (arguing that the plain meaning of the Clean Water Act unambiguously requires the application of
feasibility analysis).
31
32
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These formulations are of course not identical; it may be that in
differentiating between the "best available control technology" and
the "best available demonstrated control technology" Congress meant
to define some important difference in treatment. However, despite
these variations, EPA has largely behaved as if these statutory standards called for similar types and levels of regulation."
b) "Reasonably available" and "best practicable" technology. Not

all environmental statutes are so strict. Several provisions of the Clean
Air Act and Clean Water Act call for a type of review similar to CBA
or set a more lenient regulatory standard than those listed above. For
instance, the section of the Clean Air Act governing "non-attainment
areas"-those parts of the country that have not met EPA's ambient
air quality standards-calls for "the implementation of all reasonably
available control measures," including "reasonably available control

technology."" Similarly, a general provision of the Clean Water Act
governing pollutant discharges calls for "the application of the best
practicable control technology currently available."" In determining
what technology to classify as the "best practicable," EPA is expected
to consider "the total cost of application of technology in relation to
the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application.""
Another section of the Clean Water Act directs EPA to "require application of the best conventional pollutant control technology,"3 and
in so doing to "include consideration of the reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the
effluent reduction benefits derived.""
The Clean Water Act's admonition to consider the reasonableness of the relationship between costs and benefits in the course of
choosing the "best practicable" technology is best understood as calling for CBA. Other readings of the statute are certainly conceivable,
but even opponents of CBA have admitted that this is the best interpretation of that provision." The Clean Air Act, for its part, stops short

See Entergy Corp v Riverkeeper, Inc, 129 S Ct 1498, 1505-09 (2009).
42 USC § 7502(c)(1) (emphasis added).
33 USC § 1311(b)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
42 33 USC §1314(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
43 33 USC § 1311(b)(2)(E) (emphasis added) (regulating the emission of pollutants classified as biological oxygen demanding, suspended solids, fecal coliform, and pH).
44 33 USC § 1314(b)(4)(B) (detailing factors to consider when establishing the "best conventional pollutant control technology measures and practices").
45
Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 22-25 (cited in note 1) (conceding that the Clean Water
Act imports CBA but arguing that its construction does not reflect such analysis "as conventionally
understood" because it refuses to quantify the benefit to society from effluent limitations).
3

40
41
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of explicitly requiring CBA. Nonetheless, the use of "reasonableness"
as a touchstone seems to beg for a comparison of costs and benefits,
just as it does in other areas of law."
We summarize the most important of these statutes in Table Al
in the Appendix.
B.

OIRA, Executive Order 12866, and CBA

The statutes described above are not the only legal constraint imposed upon OSHA and EPA. Under Executive Order 12866, each
federal agency must conduct a cost-benefit analysis of any proposed
regulation with an expected economic impact greater than
$100 million." These cost-benefit analyses are reviewed by the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which has the authority to reject the regulation or return it to the agency for further consideration.4 However, this constraint is entirely internal to the administration: no outside group can sue an agency for failing to comply
with an executive order, and of course no executive order can override
a statutory mandate.4 '
Agencies thus find themselves whipsawed. In a variety of cases,
EPA must regulate under the terms of a statute that appears to call for
feasibility analysis and an executive order that demands CBA. If EPA
opts for a stringent regulation that may produce more costs than benefits, it risks having the regulation rejected by OIRA; if EPA chooses a
46 See, for example, United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir 1949)
(analyzing the "reasonable person" standard in tort law by cost-benefit balancing); People v Hall,
999 P2d 207,217-20 (Colo 2000) (analyzing the "reasonable person" standard in criminal law by
cost-benefit balancing).
47 Executive Order 12866 § 6(a)(3)(C), 58 Fed Reg 51735, 51741 (1993) (describing the
required CBA); Executive Order 12866 § 3(f)(1), 58 Fed Reg 51735, 51738 (1993) (specifying the
categories of regulations for which analyses must be conducted).
48 Executive Order 12866 § 6(b), 58 Fed Reg 51735, 51742-43 (1993). See also Heinzerling,
33 Fordham Urban L J at 1100 & nn 16-17 (cited in note 3) (discussing OIRA's increasing use of
its oversight authority under Executive Order 12866).
49 The executive orders state as piuch themselves. Executive Order 12866 § 1(a), 58 Fed
Reg 51735, 51735 (1993) ("[In choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies
should select those approaches that maximize net benefits ... unless a statute requires another
regulatory approach."); Executive Order 12866 § 9,58 Fed Reg 51735,51743 (1993) ("Nothing in
this order shall be construed as displacing the agencies' authority or responsibilities, as authorized by law."); Executive Order 12866 § 10, 58 Fed Reg 51735,51743 (1993):

Nothing in this Executive order shall affect any otherwise available judicial review of agency action. This Executive order is intended only to improve the internal management of the
Federal Government and does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
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different regulation that maximizes net benefits, it risks having that
regulation challenged (by outside groups) as incompatible with the
agency's statutory mandate. In theory, of course, OIRA's preference
for CBA should give way when an alternate approach is mandated by
statute. In reality, however, OIRA and EPA may have different interpretations of what, precisely, a statute demands. In addition, EPA may
have some amount of interpretive freedom under the familiar Chevron deference standard," which may lead OIRA to push the EPA to
exercise that interpretive authority by regulating pursuant to CBA.
Tension between Executive Order 12866 and the plain language of
many statutes is unavoidable.
C.

Judicial Interpretations

OSHA and the EPA have promulgated hundreds of regulations
under the feasibility-based statutes described above, and challenges to
those regulations have reached the appellate courts on dozens of occasions. Nearly every case involves either a claim by an environmental
or labor group that the agency has not regulated strictly enough, or a
claim by a private firm or industry group that it has regulated too
strictly. The latter is frequently accompanied by an argument that the
agency improperly failed to employ CBA; the former often involves a
claim that the agency illegally employed CBA. From this voluminous
record of judicial review, two important conclusions emerge.
First, the federal courts-led by the Supreme Court-will not

force agencies to use CBA in regulating when the governing statute
appears to trigger feasibility analysis. For instance, in American Textile
Manufacturers Institute, Inc v Donovan,2 the Court held that "to the

extent feasible" language in the Occupational Safety and Health Act
did not require OSHA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis, validating a
regulation that would not have led to widespread financial problems
but might also not have passed a cost-benefit test." In similar fashion,

so
51

See Chevron USA. Inc v NRDC, 467 US 837,865-66 (1984).
Many of these cases take the form of "arbitrary and capricious" challenges to the ratio-

nality behind the agency's decision. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United
States, Inc v State Farm Mutual Insurance Co, 463 US 29,42-43 (1983) (announcing the standard

for "arbitrary and capricious" review). These types of challenges are necessarily highly factspecific, and we do not dwell on their minutiae here. Rather, we are concerned with how the
courts have treated arguments that agencies should or should not be using CBA in the presence
of statutes that appear to call for feasibility analysis.
52 452 US 490 (1981).
53 Id at 509.
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courts of appeals have repeatedly upheld OSHA and EPA" regulations governed by "feasibility" or "best available technology" statutory language against arguments by industry groups that those regulations are not cost-benefit justified. Courts have stated repeatedly that
those statutes do not obligate OSHA and EPA to conduct cost-benefit
analyses, and that a failure to perform such analysis does not render
the resulting regulations legally infirm.
Second, EPA-and likely OSHA as well-is permitted to employ
CBA in lieu of feasibility analysis as an exercise of its discretion under
Chevron. This appears to be the case even for the most stringent of
statutory standards. In Entergy Corp v Riverkeeper, Inc,% decided in

April 2009, the Supreme Court announced that EPA could use CBA
when regulating under a section of the Clean Water Act that mandates
use of the "best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact."" The Court held that the agency's decision was reasonable under Chevron," despite classifying the "best technology
available" provision as the most stringent statutory standard con-

54

Public Citizen Health Research Group v Department of Labor, 557 F3d 165, 186 (3d Cir

2009) (upholding a hexavalent chromium exposure standard against a challenge that the agency
should have performed a type of CBA); Kennecott Greens Creek Mining Co v Mine Safety and

Health Administration, 476 F3d 946, 960 (DC Cir 2007) (upholding a diesel particulate matter
exposure limit against a challenge that an agency should have performed a type of CBA); American Iron and Steel Institute v OSHA, 939 F2d 975, 986, 992, 999, 1007 (DC Cir 1991) (upholding
an airborne lead standard as economically and technologically feasible against challenges that
the agency failed to properly account for industry compliance costs).
55

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v EPA, 540 US 461,497-500 (2004)

(upholding the applicability of an EPA nitrous oxide regulation under a "best available control
technology" standard); Texas Oil & Gas Association v EPA, 161 F3d 923,936 (5th Cir 1998) ("In
applying the BAT standard, the EPA is not obligated to evaluate the reasonableness of the relationship between costs and benefits."); American Paper Institute v Train, 543 F2d 328, 354
(DC Cir 1976) (holding that there was no requirement that EPA balance costs and benefits
under a "best available demonstrated control technology" standard); Heinzerling, 33 Fordham
Urban L J at 1102 n 32 (cited in note 3) (collecting cases addressing the argument that technology-based regulations must be subjected to CBA).
56 129 S Ct 1498 (2009).
57 Id at 1505, 1510 (interpreting 33 USC § 1326(b)).
58 Id at 1508-10. It is worth noting that this portion of the Court's opinion garnered six
votes, with Justice Stephen Breyer concurring. Id at 1512 (Breyer concurring) (agreeing that the
relevant statutory language authorizes EPA to conduct CBA). The Court specifically approved
of EPA's decision to "avoid extreme disparities between costs and benefits," and it left open the
possibility that "[o]ther arguments may be available to preclude such a rigorous form of costbenefit analysis as that ... which required weighing the total cost of application of technology
against the . . . benefits to be achieved." Id at 1508-09 (majority) (quotation marks omitted).
Nonetheless, the Court stopped short of suggesting that it believes such arguments exist. It seems
reasonable to assume that the Court would not have disapproved straightforward CBA, much
less CBA with a multiplier. See note 211 and accompanying text.
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tained within the Clean Water Act." And perhaps not surprisingly, the
Court also suggested that (less stringent) statutory sections requiring
EPA to select the "best available technology economically achievable"
and "best available demonstrated control technology" might similarly
allow for regulation based on CBA.
In fact, so far as we are aware, only one court of appeals has ever
rejected an agency decision to employ CBA as exceeding that agency's interpretive authority under Chevron-the Second Circuit in Entergy, which was promptly reversed by the Supreme Court. Courts of
appeals have occasionally used strong language rejecting CBA as "incompatible" with feasibility-based statutory provisions," but those
statements always came in the context of an agency decision not to
perform CBA. Given the deference to agency interpretation shown by
the Court in Entergy, it is difficult to believe that many "feasibility"based statutory sections will prohibit agencies from regulating on the
basis of CBA. Going forward, agencies may simply have the option of
selecting between CBA and feasibility analysis, with courts willing to
approve either methodology.62
II. FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS IN PRACTICE

A. OSHA's Chromium Regulation
1. Background and health effects.
Hexavalent chromium, Cr(VI), is a predominantly manmade
compounds used in approximately thirty major industries.4 It is used
to produce alloys, such as stainless steel, which are then often employed in welding or to form surface protection layers for plate metal
and plastic substrates.0 Cr(VI) compounds are also used as "ingreId at 1507.
Entergy, 129 S Ct at 1507 ("It is not obvious to us that [the proposition that CBA is
precluded under the Best Available Technology Economically Achievable and Best Available
Demonstrated Control Technology tests] is correct, but we need not pursue that point.").
61 See, for example, Public Citizen, 557 F3d at 177 ("we note that the Supreme Court has
conclusively ruled that economic feasibility does not involve a cost-benefit analysis.").
62
But see Entergy, 129 S Ct at 1518 (Stevens dissenting). It is beyond the scope of this
Article to determine whether this statutory interpretation is correct in each and every instance;
our argument is principally that, if given the option, agencies should prefer CBA.
63
Office of Safety and Health Administration, Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent
Chromium, 71 Fed Reg 10100, 10104 (2006), codified at 29 CFR §§ 1910,1915,1917, 1918, 1929.
6
Id at 10108. OSHA estimated that Cr(VI) is used by approximately 52,000 individual
businesses and facilities. Id at 10227.
65 Id at 10108.
59
6
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dients and catalysts" in the production of pigments and chemicals.6
However, Cr(VI) is known to cause lung cancer in addition to lesser
ailments such as asthma, dermatitis, nasal irritation, and gastrointestinal ulcers.7
As of 2004, OSHA regulations set a maximum personal exposure
level (PEL) for workers dealing with Cr(VI) of 52 gg/m 3.6 This meant
that workers could be exposed to a concentration of chromium in the
air they were breathing equal to 52 micrograms per cubic meter.
OSHA determined that lowering the allowable level of chromium
exposure could prevent as many as 300 deaths per year." This triggered OSHA's statutory obligation to "assure[], to the extent feasible
... that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or func-

tional capacity."70 Accordingly, OSHA initiated rulemaking proceedings and set out to amend the existing standard.
2. Cost-benefit analysis.
As part of the regulatory process (and to comply with Executive
Order 12866), OSHA undertook a cost-benefit analysis in which it
examined a variety of possible regulatory standards ranging from
0.25 gg/m to 20 gg/m 3.7 OSHA estimated the number of fatal and nonfatal cancers that could be prevented by imposing each of these exposure limits. (Other than a small additive factor for cases of dermatitis,"
OSHA did not include any other non-cancer illnesses due to a lack of
data on the likelihood of those conditions and their costs. 4 ) OSHA
66 Id.
67 71 Fed Reg at 10108, 10166, 10174 (cited in note 63). Studies show that in addition to
inhalation, "direct hand-to-nose contact" can also result in these symptoms. Id at 10170. In the
course of examining the threat to worker health posed by Cr(VI), OSHA determined that a
"linear relative risk model"-according to which the health risk posed by Cr(VI) exposure scales
linearly with the amount to which a worker is exposed-best fit the available data. Id at 10220
(rejecting simultaneously a threshold dose-response approach to estimating cancer risk).
68 Office of Safety and Health Administration, Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 69 Fed Reg 59306,59448-49 (2004) (proposed rule) (noting this to be the prevailing standard).
69 71 Fed Reg at 10224 (cited in note 63).
70 29 USC § 655(b)(5).
71 The rule is set out in 71 Fed Reg at 10100 (cited in note 63) (reducing the exposure limit
from 52 jg/m' of Cr(VI) to 5 jg/m'), and was upheld by the Third Circuit, see Public Citizen
Health Research Group v Departmentof Labor, 557 F3d 165,180-82 (3d Cir 2009).

72 71 Fed Reg at 10307 (cited in note 63).
73 Id at 10305, 10307 (relying on data from the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health). Medical costs per case were estimated to be $119 and secondary costs $1,239. Id at
10307. Based on an incidence of 0.2 percent to 1 percent, OSHA estimated 418 to 2,089 cases of
dermatitis annually and presumed a 50 percent reduction to 209 to 1,045 cases. Id.
74

Id at 10307.
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then monetized the benefits of avoiding these cancers using the EPA
standard valuation of $6.8 million per life saved and a range of values
for nonfatal cancers extending from $188,502 per cancer avoided (the
medical cost of treating such an illness) to $4 million (the best estimate of individuals' willingness to pay to avoid a nonfatal case)."
OSHA then discounted the projected annual monetized benefits to
present value, performing one calculation using a rate of 3 percent and
another calculation with a 7 percent discount rate." Table 1 displays
the results of OSHA's cost-benefit analysis.

Id at 10305.
71 Fed Reg at 10306 table VIII-11 (cited in note 63). The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) currently recommends that agencies perform CBA using discount rates of both
3 percent and 7 percent. See Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-94, Guidelines and
75
76

Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of FederalPrograms 8 (Oct 29, 1992), available at 57

Fed Reg 53519, 53523-24 (1992); Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory
Analysis 33-34 (Sept 17, 2003), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circularsla004/a-4.pdf
(visited Nov 15,2009).
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TABLE 1: OSHA CR(VI) COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
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Source: 71 Fed Reg at 10304 table VIII-10, 10306 table VIII-11, 10308 table VIII-12 (cited in note 63).
Note: Dollar figures refer to millions of 2003 dollars.
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As Table 1 shows, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding
the potential costs and benefits of chromium regulation. Many of the
high and low estimates of benefits are more than an order of magnitude apart, and the choice of discount rate affected the calculations of
benefits by approximately a factor of two. (This is in addition to the
fact that the cost-benefit analysis incorporates only cancers and dermatitis and excludes other illnesses.) The cost-benefit analysis nevertheless provides a significant amount of information. While the health
consequences of chromium exposure scale approximately linearly, the
costs of complying with increasingly stringent standards clearly do not.
Rather, they increase exponentially as the regulatory standard becomes stricter. For instance, the cost to industry of complying with a
5 gg/m3 exposure limit is $112 million greater than the cost of complying with a 10 pg/m' exposure limit, while the cost of complying with a
0.25 pg/mn limit is nearly $800 million greater than the cost of complying with a 0.5 gg/m' standard.
Accordingly, the 0.25 pg/m3 standard is not cost-benefit justified
under any set of assumptions, while the 0.5 Rg/n' standard is not costbenefit justified under any but the most optimistic assumptions. On
the other hand, both the 5 pg/m and 10 pg/mn' standards would produce
greater net benefits than the 20 pg/m 3 standard under nearly any set of
assumptions. OSHA's cost-benefit analysis is thus helpful in narrowing
the range of useful possibilities, even taking into account the high degree of uncertainty involved. The socially optimal exposure limit for
Cr(VI) likely lies somewhere within the range of 1 pg/m to 10 pg/mn.
In its original notice of proposed rulemaking, OSHA suggested
an exposure limit of 1 pg/m'. 7 When OSHA eventually published the
final rule, the agency had revised its regulatory goals and settled on an
exposure limit of 5 pg/mn." OSHA never fully explained the reasons
for this change, and the ultimate rationale behind it remains unclear.
However, OSHA may have been under pressure from several fronts: it
received a number of negative comments from potentially regulated
parties about the proposed 1 pg/mn standard;7 a preliminary feasibility
analysis showed that such a stringent limitation might put several industries under significant pressure (more on this later);" and, in addition, OSHA may have been influenced by the cost-benefit analysis
outlined above.
7
78
79
80

69 Fed Reg at 59448-49 (cited in note 68).
71 Fed Reg at 10378 (cited in note 63) (amending 29 CFR § 1910.1026).
See id at 10333-34.
See id at 10301-02.
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3. Feasibility analysis.
Before promulgating a regulation setting a new exposure limit of
5 gg/m3 , OSHA was of course required to conduct a feasibility analysis. The Occupational Safety and Health Act does not define "feasibility"-the specifics are left to the agency. Here, OSHA attached a particular set of numerical values to that statutory standard. OSHA policy required that in order for a regulation to be considered economically feasible-in the sense of avoiding widespread plant closings-it

must not cause revenue within an industry to decline by more than
1 percent or profits to decline by more than 10 percent." (We refer to
this as OSHA's "1percent/10 percent rule.") However, OSHA reserved the right to except industries from this standard under certain
circumstances -to impose regulations even though projected revenue
or profit declines would exceed the 1 percent/10 percent thresholds.
In order to conduct its feasibility analysis, OSHA surveyed
250 potentially affected industries." The surveys asked businesses
whether they used Cr(VI) as part of normal business operations and,
if so, what proportion of those operations involved potential chromium exposure. Pursuant to these surveys, OSHA identified nine in3 standustries where the costs of complying with the proposed 5 ig/m
dard were expected to exceed 1 percent of revenues, and an additional
twenty-two where costs were expected to exceed 10 percent of profits
(but revenue loss would be less than 1 percent). We list these industries and their projected profit and revenue losses in Table A2 in the
Appendix. However, OSHA ascertained that nineteen of the thirtyone substantially affected industries were "plating or welding application groups in which actual plating or welding are exceedingly rare.""
As a result, OSHA concluded that it would be improper to extrapolate from the responses of one or a few businesses to the entire industry, as it typically does in the course of a feasibility analysis." Either
those businesses were outliers, and the chromium regulation would
not significantly harm the industry, or the business may have checked

Id at 10299-300.
The federal government classifies industries according to the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS), created by OMB to standardize the collection and analysis of
industry-wide data. See 71 Fed Reg at 10271-79 table VIII-7 (cited in note 63). For details on the
81
82

NAICS, see US Census Bureau, North American Industry Classification System, online at

http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics (visited Nov 15,2009).
83
71 Fed Reg at 10300 (cited in note 63).
8
Id.
5
Id at 10300-01. See also id at 10281.
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an incorrect box on OSHA's survey.M OSHA disregarded the effects of
chromium regulation in those cases.
That left twelve industries that OSHA conceded would be affected beyond the 1 percent/10 percent threshold.8 Even in the face of
these twelve violations of its 1 percent/10 percent rule, OSHA elected
to proceed with the regulation. The agency justified its waiver of the
1 percent/10 percent standard with respect to these industries according to a variety of arguments:
* In several cases, OSHA decided that demand for the chromium-related product was highly inelastic and concluded that
affected firms would be able to pass compliance costs directly
along to consumers, saving the firms from closing." The fact that
consumers would then bear these costs was not part of the
analysis.90 OSHA also did not address foreign competition;91 if
foreign firms do not bear the cost of regulation, then domestic
firms cannot pass on compliance costs to consumers.
* OSHA classified other industries -typically welding industries
geared around machinery repair-as primarily "service" indus7 It concluded that overseas competition was not a real
tries.9
concern for these industries, and thus that demand was relatively inelastic.93 This is a non sequitur; demand could certainly be
elastic even without direct foreign competition.
* In other cases, OSHA concluded similarly that the products
and services being produced were in high demand within the
American market or constituted an irreplaceable link in a larger market chain." OSHA's unstated view must have been that
demand would be relatively inelastic, though here again the
possibility of foreign competitors went unmentioned.
* OSHA excepted several industries on the ground that they had
recently absorbed profit fluctuations or price increases greater
than those expected from the new regulation.95 The agency did

8

Id.
71 Fed Reg at 10300-01 (cited in note 63).
Id at 10301-4)2.

89

Id.

9

Id.

8
8

91 71 Fed Reg at 10302 (cited in note 63).

Id at 10301-02.
Id at 10302.
SId at 10301-02.
95 71 Fed Reg at 10300-01 (cited in note 63).
9
9
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not account for the fact that fluctuations in profits are not the
same as guaranteed declines in profits.
* Finally, OSHA excepted several other industries because alternatives to Cr(VI) or cheaper emission control technologies existed and could be easily substituted." This rationale amounts to
a claim that costs were simply not as high as OSHA had estimated in its own feasibility analysis.
We summarize these explanations, as applied to the relevant industries, in Table A2 of the Appendix, and we provide a sampling of
them here.

9

Id at 10302.
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TABLE 2: SELECTED RESULTS OF

OSHA's FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS

Compliance
Costs as a
Percentage of
Profits

Compliance
Costs as a
Percentage of
Revenue

Industry
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Explanation of Deviation
from Screening

Electroplating-General Industry

Electroplating, Plating, Polishing
Anodizing, and
Coloring Services
(NAICS 332813)

30.15%

1.24%

Industry sells service not product,
so overseas competition should
not be strong. Electroplating is
"essential to the manufacture of
most plated products," implying
that demand is unlikely to decrease. Industry experienced and
survived profit variation of up to
49 percent in single year. The 1.24
percent price increase is "significantly less than the average annual increase in price." Demand is
inelastic because plating is just a
component of product's total cost
(less than

0.5 percent).

Welding-Construction Industry (Stainless Steel)
Building, Developing,
and General
Contracting; Heavy
Construction; Special
Trade Contractors
(NAICS 233,234,235)

0.92%

22.33%

Passing costs on would only increase price 0.92 percent and steel
prices have varied more than 10
percent a year without affecting
the industry.

Painting-General Industry
Used Car Dealers
(NAICS 1120)

33.66%

0.41%

Cr(VI) alternatives already exist,
the use of Cr(VI) is only a small
portion of the actual business, and
demand is probably fairly
inelastic.

Automotive Body,
Paint, and Interior
Repair and
Maintenance
(NAICS 811121)

39.16%

1.50%

fairly inelastic.

1

1

Cr(VI) alternatives are already
developed, the use of Cr(VI) is
only a small portion of the actual
business, and demand is probably

Chromium Catalyst Producers
All Other Basic
Inorganic Chemical
Manufacturers
(NAICS 325188)

0.80%

27.14%

Short-term demand is relatively
inelastic since most companies
would need major new investments to shift away from CR(VI)
catalysts.

Source: 71 Fed Reg at 10272-80 table VII-7 (cited in note 63) (data); 71 Fed Reg at 10301-02 (cited in note 63)
(explanation).
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As an initial matter, it is possible to draw several conclusions from
the manner in which OSHA conducted this feasibility analysis. First,
OSHA's stated 1 percent/10 percent rule operated as only a weak constraint. OSHA overrode its general rule in a dozen instances, including
several cases in which industries were expected to suffer profit losses
greater than 20 percent. These deviations would seem a great deal more
arbitrary were it not for the arbitrariness of the 1 percent/10 percent
rule itself OSHA made no serious attempt to justify that standard,
nor-more importantly-did it tie it to the DC Circuit's standard for
feasibility: that the regulation not threaten "the existence or competitive structure of an industry."" The ease with which OSHA accepted
multiple deviations from its 1 percent/10 percent rule seems to imply
that the agency did not view its own standard as a constraint.
Second, OSHA's exceptions to the 1 percent/10 percent rule are
neither well reasoned nor well documented. OSHA provides little
explanation for its broad conclusions about major industries, and (as
noted above") at certain points its claims seem to skip over important
logical links. This is in addition to the fact that many of OSHA's rationales-perhaps all of them-actually amounted to claims that profits

in an industry would not decrease by the proportion OSHA expected.
OSHA's claim that it had excepted industries from the
1 percent/10 percent rule is not precisely correct; in fact, OSHA simply contravened its own findings. In many cases OSHA may well be
correct to adjust its own results, but the ease with which standard assessments of lost profits and lost revenues were discarded speaks
poorly of the reliability of those numbers in the first place. On the
whole, OSHA's exceptions have the air of post hoc rationalizations:
having decided to regulate, OSHA appears to have simply done the
paperwork necessary to clear a few formal obstacles.
Finally, it is entirely conceivable that OSHA's feasibility analysis
led the agency to select a suboptimal level of regulation -though not
for the reasons that feasibility analysis is typically criticized. Industry
groups frequently attack feasibility analysis for enabling more stringent regulation than they deem appropriate." Here, however, feasibility analysis may well have led OSHA to opt for too weak a regulatory
standard, from a social welfare perspective. On a plausible set of as9
United Steelworkers of America v Marshall,647 F2d 1189, 1272 (DC Cir 1980) (requiring
that EPA "construct a reasonable estimate of compliance costs" in order to demonstrate a "reasonable likelihood" that the industry's existence or structure is not put in danger).
98 See notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
99 This is in many cases a valid criticism, and one we take up in Part I1I.A.5.
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sumptions,'" a 1 gg/m' exposure limit actually produces greater net
benefits than a 5 gg/m' exposure limit. Recall that OSHA initially considered setting the exposure limit at 1 gg/m3 only to discard it in favor
of a more relaxed standard, in part because a preliminary feasibility
analysis indicated that at least one industry might suffer losses great
enough to threaten its survival."o' It is difficult to understand why one
or two industries ought to hold effective veto rights over a regulation
that might substantially benefit workers in numerous other segments
of the economy, but feasibility analysis-at least as performed by
OSHA-invites precisely this result.

B.

EPA's Paper Mill Regulation
1. Background.

Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills discharge hazardous chemicals
into the water and hazardous pollutants into the air. The discharges
into the water sicken and kill fish and may cause harm, including cancer, to humans who eat those fish. The emissions into the air cause
cancer, other diseases (such as respiratory disease), unwanted symptoms (such as headaches), and bad smells. In 1998, EPA issued a new
rule that revised and updated earlier rules regulating this industry
pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water
Act. 02 To keep our exposition as simple as possible, we focus on the
effluent limitations-the regulations governing the discharge of waste
into bodies of water. These limitations were applied to mills that used
a particular wood pulp production process in which wood chips are dissolved in caustic soda or sodium sulfide (the bleached papergrade kraft
and soda category), and to mills that used related sulfite-based processes
(the papergrade sulfite category)." Ninety-six such mills were in operation in the United States at the time of the regulation. 05

100 Those assumptions are a 3 percent discount rate and benefits near the higher end of the
possible range. See Table 1.
101 See notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
102 EPA, NationalEmission Standardsfor HazardousAir Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp
and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines PretreatmentStandards; and New Source
Performance Standards: Pulp,Paper,and PaperboardCategory,63 Fed Reg 18504,18585-87 (1998).
103 See id at 18504. The regulation was upheld by the DC Circuit. See National Wildlife
Federation v EPA, 286 F3d 554,557 (DC Cir 2002).
104 See Forestry Insights, Pulp and Paper,online at http-/www.insightsco.nz/products-processes
pp.aspx (visited Nov 15,2009).
105 63 Fed Reg at 18505 (cited in note 102).
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Under the Clean Water Act, different standards apply to different
types of regulated activity, depending (for example) on whether a facility existed prior to regulation or not,' whether discharges are direct
or indirect," and the nature and toxicity of the pollutant." In the context of paper mill regulation, all of these possibilities arise, and hence
EPA in principle was required to regulate under multiple standardsbest practicable control technology currently available, best conventional pollutant control technology, best available technology economically achievable, among others-with presumably the strictest prevailing. 7 EPA considered three regulatory options under the best
available technology standard, with the aim of limiting or removing
chlorine from the production process, of which cancer-causing dioxin
and furan are byproducts.o "Option A" required the mills to substitute
chlorine dioxide for elemental chlorine in the production process,
which reduces but does not eliminate the discharge of dioxin and furan.... "Option B" was a stricter rule, involving the Option A limits
plus delignification (the removal of lignin, a material in wood pulp)
and other restrictions on the manufacturing process. The effect
would be to reduce the discharge of dioxin and furan still further but
not eliminate it. "Option TCF" ("totally chlorine free"), stricter still,
required the complete elimination of all chlorine from the production
process, which would eliminate discharge of furan and dioxin."'
2. Cost-benefit analysis.
Pulp mills rarely discharge waste into commercial fisheries."
Commercially distributed fish caught where waste is discharged are

1o6 Compare, for example, 33 USC § 1311(b)(2)(A) (requiring standards for existing facilities which "require application of the best available technology economically achievable for such
category or class") with 33 USC § 1316(a)(1) (requiring standards for new facilities which "reflect[ ] the greatest degree of effluent reduction ... achievable through application of the best
available demonstrated control technology").
107 See, for example, 33 USC § 1311(b)(2)(A); 33 USC § 1313(d)(1); 33 USC § 1362(14); 33
USC § 1313(d)(1).
108 See, for example, 33 USC § 1311(b)(2)(C)-(D).
10 See 63 Fed Reg at 18513-14 (cited in note 102).

110 Id at 18541-43.

III Id at 18542 (noting that, in mills used to provide data for Option A, "kappa factors for
softwood furnish averaged .17 and all were less than .2").
112 Id at 18541-42.
113 63 Fed Reg at 18542 (cited in note 102).
114 EPA, Economic Analysis for the National Emission Standardsfor HazardousAir Pollutants for Source Category:Pulp and Paper Production;Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standar4 and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper,and PaperboardCatego-
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not numerous and are distributed widely, and so constitute an insignificant portion of the average consumer's diet."' Accordingly, EPA considered only the health effects for recreational and subsistence anglers."6 Before regulation, between 0.83 and 2.76 statistical lives were
lost per year as a result of the paper mill discharges."W Option A would
reduce annual statistical deaths by between 0.73 and 2.41, and Option
B would reduce annual statistical deaths by between 0.75 and 2.50."'

To monetize these figures, EPA used a very broad range for the value
of a statistical life (between $2.5 and $9 million)."' The highest possible benefit was accordingly $21.7 million per year under Option A and
$22.5 million per year under Option B. ' In a separate "sensitivity
analysis," EPA estimated that Option TCF would reduce statistical
cancer deaths by between 0.83 and 2.76 per year-thus eliminating the
entire pre-regulation risk of death-providing a potential benefit of
up to $25.2 million.'
EPA also stated that the regulations would reduce risk of noncancer illnesses but (like OSHA) did not report monetary estimates
because of inadequate data.'" Further, by reducing the amount of dioxin in fisheries, the regulations would reduce the number of dioxinrelated fish advisories and hence would increase the number of anglers who would be able to use those fisheries.'2EPA valued this benefit at $2 to $20 million per year for both Option A and Option B.124
Increased participation of anglers would add another $4.7 to
$15.5 million per year, but because of uncertainties EPA did not end
up including these figures in its benefit estimate.'2 Finally, the ability to
ry-Phase I ch 8, 8 (Oct 27, 1997), online at http://www.epa.gov/ost/pulppaper/jd/pulp.pdf (visited Nov 15,2009).
115 Id.

Id. See also 63 Fed Reg at 18587 (cited in note 102).
63 Fed Reg at 18588 (cited in note 102).
118 Id at 18588,18591.
119Economic Analysis at ch 8, 12 table 8-6 (cited in note 114) (calculating the annual monetized benefits from reduction in cancer cases).
120 Id. The normal value of a life is $6 million. Eric Posner, Dollars and Death, 72 U Chi L
Rev 537, 549 & table 2 (2005) (noting that "most regulatory agencies have now converged on a
fairly narrow range for the valuation of life: $5 million to $6.5 million," and listing the values
used by various agencies). EPA also calculated the effect of the options on the Native American
angler population, but because the numbers are so small and uncertain, EPA omitted them from
its analysis. See Economic Analysis at ch 8, 9-14 (cited in note 114); 63 Fed Reg at 18589 (cited in
note 102).
121 EconomicAnalysis at ch 8,45 (cited in note 114).
122 Id at ch 8, 14.
123 Id at ch 8,23.
124 Id at ch 8,23,26 table 8-12.
125 Economic Analysis at ch 8,23-24,26 table 8-12 (cited in note 114).
116

117
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use cheaper sludge disposal methods would save another $8 to
$16 million per year.'" Option TCF would have the same effect." Aggregate benefits were $11.9 to $57.1 million for Option A," $12 to
$57.9 million for Option B,'' and $12.1 to $60.6 million for Option TCF.
EPA estimated compliance costs of approximately $262 million
per year for Option A,"' $324 million for Option B, 32 and $1.1 billion
for Option TCF." It did not calculate aggregate present values for the
benefits and costs for each option,'" but quite clearly they were negative, especially because capital costs would occur in the near term and
many of the benefits, such as avoided cancer deaths, would be enjoyed
only in the long term. Of the three options, Option A is the least bad,
reducing social wealth by, on average, only about $200 million per year
(assuming benefits at the maximum of the range).
The effluent regulation is not the whole story, however. As noted
earlier, the rule combined both effluent and emission regulations under the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, and the EPA integrated the
cost-benefit analyses of both sets of regulations."' The reason for this is
that Options B and TCF would produce hazardous emissions that would
require further controls under the Clean Air Act.'" The combined annual
benefits for Option A ranged between -$727 million"' and $1.5 billion,"
while the combined annual costs were $420 million'39 -more or less a
wash if we take the midpoint of the benefits. Table 3 provides a summary of the analysis.

Id at ch 8,25.
Id at ch 8,45.
128 Id at ch 8,26 table 8-12.
129 Economic Analysis at ch 8, 26 table 8-12 (cited in note 114).
13o Id at ch 8,46 table 8-21.
131 Id at ch 5,25 table 5-16.
132 Id at ch 5, 25 table 5-16.
133 Economic Analysis at ch 5, 28 table 5-18 (cited in note 114).
134 EPA does report present values for the integrated rules, including emissions limitations.
See id at ch 10,4 table 10-2.
135 See text accompanying note 103.
136 See 63 Fed Reg at 18552 (cited in note 102) (noting that EPA combined the Clean Air
Act and Clean Water Act reviews "expressly to address these cross-media issues").
137 Negative benefits are possible because the emissions regulation replaces some hazardous emissions with other hazardous emissions; under certain conditions, the latter emissions
could cause more harm. See, for example, EconomicAnalysis at ch 4,7 (cited in note 114).
138 Id at ch 10, 1, 2 table 10-1 (providing a breakdown of water- and air-related benefits).
139 Id.
126

127
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TABLE 3: PULP AND PAPER REGULATION:
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OPTIONS
Rules

Option A
FinalRule
CAA Rule

Individually

CAA Rule

Individually

CAA Rule

$1,039

$1,394

$2,203

$2,694

$3,159

$3,650

$158

$211

$94

$163

$790

$859

$262.8

$351.1

$324.0

$442.4

$1,096.5

$1,214.8

__ndiHvdully

Capital
Costs

Option TCF
Alternate Rule #2

Option B
AlternateRule #1

Operation
and
Management
Costs

Pre-Tax
Annualized
Costs

I

Total Annual
Monetized
Benefits

$11.9$57.1

($738.5)$1,496

$12.0$57.9

($738.4)$1,496

$12.1$60.6

($738.3)$1,497

Net Benefits

($250.9)($205.7)

($1,089.6)$1,144.9

($312.0)($266.1)

($1,180.8)$1,053.6

($1,084.4)($1,035.9)

($1,953.1)$282.2

Source: Economic Analysis at ch 3 at 2, ch 4 at 23, ch 5 at 25 table 5-16, ch 5 at 28 table 5-18, ch 8 at 26 table 8-12,
ch 8 at 27 table 8-13, ch 8 at 46 table 8-21 (cited in note 114).
Note: All dollar amounts are in millions of 1995 dollars. Amounts that are surrounded by parentheses are negative. EPA used a 7 percent discount rate in all of its calculations. Costs were apparently annualized over a thirtyyear period, with capital costs being double counted in both the first and twenty-first years, and annual operation
and management costs counted every year after the first. Economic Analysis at ch 4, 23 (cited in note 114).

3. Feasibility analysis.
EPA did not explicitly refer to feasibility analysis, but it conducted what it called an analysis of "economic impact" that resembles
OSHA's feasibility analysis for the chromium rule, albeit without the
compliance thresholds.'o
First, EPA examined mill closures. Ninety-six mills would be affected by the regulation."' Of these, one would be closed under Option A, two under Option B, and seven under Option TCF."' EPA
made these estimates on the basis of accounting data reported by the
firms."' If the cost of compliance would be greater than the profits
generated by a particular mill, then that mill would close. OSHA, by
contrast, looked directly at the impact on profits.'"

140
141
142
143
144

See Economic Analysis at ch 3,1-28 (cited in note 114).
Id at ch 6,16.
Id at ch 6, 15 table 6-4,44 table 6-19.
See id at ch 3,4.
See text accompanying note 81.
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Second, EPA examined job loss. The industry employed
90,840 workers." EPA estimated that 400 jobs would be lost under
Option A,'o 900 under Option B,"' and 7,100 under Option TCE'
These jobs refer to those of workers in firms that would be shut
down."9 EPA also noted that 5,700 jobs would be lost in aggregate under Option A-including job losses in mills that are not shut down but
suffer a loss in demand-and between 9,900 and 27,700 jobs would be
lost under Option B, but did not provide comparable figures for TCF'-o
Third, EPA considered bankruptcies of firms. Thirty-six firms
would be affected by the regulation."' EPA estimated that no publicly
owned firms would be bankrupted under Option A, and more than
one would be bankrupted under Option B.' 2 The estimate was based
on an algorithm that uses accounting data as inputs and generates a
probability that the firm will enter bankruptcy."' EPA did not perform
this analysis for Option TCF but reasoned that it would bankrupt at
least as many firms as Option B.
As noted, EPA, unlike OSHA, did not set a compliance threshold
for revenue or profit loss, or plant closings in general. It simply reported
this information without comment."' Table 4 provides a summary. Table 4
also includes the feasibility analysis for the integrated regulation that
includes emissions standards. These standards applied to a greater number of mills, jobs, and firms, and those figures are included in Table 4."6

145 Economic Analysis at ch 6, 44 table 6-19 (cited in note 114) (showing that, without price
increase, the industry was expected to continue employing 90,840 workers).
146 Id at ch 6,15 table 6-4 (comparing jobs lost under Option A and Option B).
147 Id.

148 Id at ch 6,44 table 6-19 (comparing jobs lost under Option B and Option TCF).
149 See Economic Analysis at ch 6, 15 table 6-4, 44 table 6-19 (cited in note 114); id at ch 6,
12, 16 (noting that the closure of one firm under Option A would result in the loss of about
400 jobs, whereas, under Option B, about 900 jobs would be lost between the two firm closures).
150 Id at ch 6,35 table 6-15.
151 Id at ch 6,4.
152 Idatch6,6.

153 See Economic Analysis at ch 6, 4 (cited in note 114) (noting the use of the Altman's Z
score for each company, a "weighted average of financial ratios" used to predict company distress and failure).
154 63 Fed Reg at 18584 (cited in note 102) (noting that job losses and closures were high
enough under TCF that the additional firm failure analysis was unnecessary).
155 See text accompanying note 140.
156 See 63 Fed Reg at 18573 (cite in note 102).
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TABLE 4: PULP AND PAPER REGULATION:
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF OPTIONS
Option A

Rules
Option B

Option TCF

FinalRule

Alternate Rule #1

Alternate Rule #2

Individually

CAA Rule

Individually

CAA Rule

Individually

CAA Role

1/96

2/158

2/96

4/158

7/96

9/158

400

900

900

4,800

7,100

10,200

0/37

0/52

>1/37

>1/52

>1/37

>1/52

Mill Closures /
Regulated

Mills
Job Losses
from Mill
Closures
Baseline:
90,840

Firm Failures /
Regulated
Firms

Source: Economic Analysis at ch 2 at 3, 29, ch 6 at 4-6, 15 table 6-4, 17 table 6-5, 44 table 6-19 (cited in
note 114).

EPA concluded on the basis of this analysis that Option A was "economically achievable," and that Option B and Option TCF were not."'
The question, then, is why Option A satisfied the feasibility test.
Is it because a regulation that causes the closure of only one of
96 mills is "feasible"? Or is the relevant issue job loss or bankruptcy?
And where is the line to be drawn? EPA said that seven mill closures
and 7,100 job losses made Option TCF infeasible without considering
firm failures."' What if these numbers were incrementally lower? More
puzzles arise when one considers the integrated regulation options.
Now Option A shuts down two mills and eliminates 900 jobs. How
does one determine whether these extra harms are justified by the
additional benefits from the emissions limits? In addition, mill closures (2) and job losses (900) are the same under the unachievable
Option B by itself and the integrated Option A. The only difference is
the lack of firm failure. EPA said that failures are "particularly problematic,".. but did not elaborate. In addition, EPA has issued other
157 63 Fed Reg at 18550, 18584 (cited in note 102). However, Option B was chosen for new
sources. Id at 18553.
158 Id at 18584 (explaining that, because of the significant number of closures and job losses, there
was no need to conduct a firm failure analysis or determine combined direct and indirect impacts).
159 Id at 18550 (noting that increased closures and job losses were considered to be "strong
indicators of economic unachievability," but focusing more heavily on potential firm failures).
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rules despite the fact that they caused firm failures.. Does it matter
what size the firm is? Should it not matter? Since mills employ different numbers of workers (400 at the most vulnerable mill, 500 at the
second most, and 3,900 at the third and fourth most vulnerable mills
combined, or 1,950 at each on average),'6 ' a larger mill could easily
employ more workers and produce more paper than a smaller firm.
Whatever feasibility analysis's ambiguities, it is clear about one
thing: losses to consumer welfare do not play a role in the test. Because EPA nonetheless performed an analysis of the effect of the
rules, we can see the consequence of this approach. EPA estimated
that Option A would increase the cost of paper products for people
with incomes under $10,000 from 2.09 to 2.13 percent of pre-tax income,
in aggregate $26.1 million. The losses to the general public would be
much higher, of course, as reflected in the cost-benefit analysisalthough, ideally, a cost-benefit analysis would also monetize the benefits that EPA omitted.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS

A. The Economic Consequences of Feasibility Analysis
1. A framework.
As we have noted, feasibility analysis comes in different formulations. We focus on OSHA's because of its precision, but our analysis
applies to others as well, and we briefly address EPA's approach.
OSHA's feasibility analysis proceeds as follows:
1. Identify a workplace that is unsafe.'
2. Define the relevant industry or industries.'"
3. Determine the technologically feasible (that is, available)
measures that can reduce or eliminate the risk.'"
160 See, for example, EPA, PharmaceuticalManufacturing Category Effluent Limitations
Guidelines,Pretreatment Standards and New Source Performance Standards, 63 Fed Reg 50388,

50406 (1998) (conceding that several facilities were likely to close due to the cost of complying
with the regulation under consideration).
161See Table 4 (aggregating the loss of jobs from each new closure).
162 Economic Analysis at ch 8,43 (cited in note 114).
163 Industrial Union Department,AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607,642

(1980) ("Benzene Case") ("[OSHA] is required to make a threshold finding that a place of
employment is unsafe-in the sense that significant risks are present and can be eliminated or
lessened by a change in practices.").
164 See, for example, text accompanying notes 82-83.
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4. Require firms in the industry to adopt these measures unless
the cost of doing so would cause widespread plant closings or
(in OSHA's formulation):
a. Reduce industry profits by more than 10 percent; or
b. Reduce industry revenues by more than 1 percent.'
Analysts refer to step three as the technological feasibility requirement and step four as the economic feasibility requirement. Step one
is straightforward; we evaluate steps two through four below.
2. Industry.
Feasibility analysis requires some definition of industry because
the technological feasibility requirement typically refers to technologies used in the industry being regulated,'7 and the economic feasibility requirement refers to plant closings within that industry.' To understand the importance of this requirement, imagine that Substance X
causes harm to workers who are exposed to it. Industry 1 uses Substance X to paint cars. Industry 2 uses Substance X to paint aircraft. A
technologically feasible regulation would require employers to supply
workers with respirators at the cost of (say) $500 per worker.
It is easy to see that this identical regulation might cause widespread plant closings in one industry but not another. Industry 1 (let
us suppose) faces elastic demand. If firms supply respirators and raise
prices, they lose customers. Plants that had been justified by economies of scale are shut down and workers lose jobs. Industry 2 faces
inelastic demand. Firms pass on the costs to consumers and demand
remains constant. No plants close.
If Industries 1 and 2 are treated separately for the purpose of feasibility analysis, then regulations will mandate respirators only in Industry 2, not in Industry 1. If Industries 1 and 2 are treated as the same
industry-the industrial consumer-products painting industry-then

the agency would need to determine whether the respirator rule
would cause widespread plant closures in the whole industry that
combines 1 and 2. Using OSHA's chromium approach, this would inSee, for example, text accompanying notes 72-78.
See text accompanying note 81.
167 See, for example, 71 Fed Reg at 10337 (cited in note 63) ("To find the proposed PEL
technologically feasible for an industry, OSHA must prove a reasonable possibility that the
typical firm can meet it with engineering and work practice controls in most operations.") (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
168 See Benzene Case, 448 US at 671 (Rehnquist concurring in the judgment).
165
166
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volve determining whether the regulation reduces revenues by
1 percent and profits by 10 percent for the joint industry. If so, the respirator rule is imposed, and car-painting plants are shut down. If not,
the respirator rule is not imposed. It is clear that whether respirators
are used thus depends on a rather arbitrary notion of how broadly the
industry is defined.
Industries do not come in natural kinds. Any industry can be subdivided indefinitely. In our Industry 1, closer examination might reveal
that some firms paint cars and boats, while other firms paint only cars.
The firms in each subindustry could have different cost structures, so
that if we applied the feasibility test to each subindustry, one subindustry would pass the test and the other would not. Then it could turn
out that, among firms that paint cars and boats, some provide high-end
work, while others provide low-end work; some do custom work, while
others do mass-produced work; some serve a particular region; some
export and others do not; and so on, until each firm belongs to its own
"industry." Feasibility analysis would then simply require firms that
are large (their revenues are high) and profitable to adopt the safety
precautions, but not smaller and poorer firms.
One might try to define industry in light of the purpose of feasibility analysis. But it is not clear what the purpose of that test is. If the
purpose is to permit regulation up to the point of significant job loss,
then one should not use an industry definition at all. The relevant consideration would be the total number of lost jobs, regardless of the
industry from which they disappear. Another possible purpose is to
protect workers with industry-specific skills -skills that can be applied
to one type of production process and not others. Workers with such
skills who lose their jobs may not be able to find jobs in another industry. On this theory, plant shutdowns scattered across industries are
less troublesome than those concentrated in a single industry, even if
the total number of jobs lost is the same.6 If this is the purpose of feasibility analysis, then industries should be defined with reference to the
transferability of skills. Another possible purpose is to avoid substantial
job losses in a single region, on the theory that workers are not highly
geographically mobile. If this is the purpose of feasibility analysis, then
industries should be defined with reference to geography.

169

See, for example, Derek Neal, Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from Dis-

placed Workers, 13 J Labor Econ 653,669-70 (1995) (discussing the wage cost of switching industries and the loss of human capital).
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That is not how agencies define industries. Instead, they use the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)."o The Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) developed NAICS in order to
regularize statistical reporting by government agencies. NAICS divides industries into more than a thousand six-digit codes. Classification is allegedly based on the similarity of production processes.
Consider the following example:
333311 Automatic Vending Machine Manufacturing
333312 Commercial Laundry, Drycleaning, and Pressing
Machine Manufacturing
333313 Office Machinery Manufacturing
333314 Optical Instrument and Lens Manufacturing
333315 Photographic and Photocopying Equipment Manufacturing
333319 Other Commercial and Service Industry Machinery
Manufacturing
A firm that manufactures vending machines and a firm that manufactures pressing machines belong to different industries because the
production processes are different. A firm that manufactures hole
punchers and a firm that manufactures calculators belong to the same
industry - Office Machine Manufacturing - because their production

processes are ostensibly similar."3 But the similarity or difference of
production processes is not the same thing as the substitutability of
jobs. An assembly-line worker, or custodian, or security guard could
probably work in any of these firms. And of course these classifications say essentially nothing about geography. Another government
classification system divides up occupations according to their similarity, but agencies do not use that system.1 74
170

See, for example, 71 Fed Reg at 10337 (cited in note 63) (OSHA); EPA, Coal Mining

PointSource Category;Amendments to Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Perfor-

mance Standards,67 Fed Reg 3370,3370 (2002) (EPA).
171

See US Census Bureau, NAICS-Frequently Asked Questions,What Is NAICS and How Is

It Used?, online at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/faqs/faqs.html#ql (visited Nov 15,2009).
172 See US Census Bureau, 2007 NAICS Definition, online at httpJ/www.census.gov/cgibin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?chartcode=31&search=2007%20NAICS%20Search (visited Nov 15,2009).
173 We are hardly experts, but we have our doubts.
174

US Census Bureau, NAICS -Frequently Asked Questions, How Can I Find an Occupa-

tional NAICS Code?, online at http://www.censusgov/eos/www/naics/faqs/faqs.html#ql9 (visited
Nov 15, 2009). An occupation-based classification system, the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system, has been developed by the Bureau of Labor Standards, but the two systems
are separate entities. See Bureau of Labor Standards, Standard Occupational Classification

2010]

Against FeasibilityAnalysis

691

This is a problem if the purpose of economic feasibility is to prevent regulations from harming workers by eliminating their jobs. A
regulation that completely eliminated office machinery manufacturing
would have little impact on employment if workers can easily find
jobs in other commercial and service industry machinery manufacturing. Accordingly, the fact of widespread plant closures in an industry
reveals little about the regulation's impact on workers.
Agencies appear to be aware of this problem, which they address
by tinkering with industry classifications on an ad hoc basis."' This
means that whether a regulation turns out to be economically feasible
or not is essentially a discretionary judgment by the agency.
It is worth noting that agencies may elect to alter (or scrap) a
regulation entirely rather than exempt certain industries from otherwise general rules. For instance, if a regulation as applied to some industry would be infeasible per OSHA's 1 percent/10 percent rule,
OSHA may elect to either except that industry from the
1 percent/10 percent rule and apply the regulation anyway or scrap
the regulation. This is effectively what happened in the chromium
case: the one microgram standard looked as though it would do too
much damage to one industry, so OSHA scrapped it in favor of a
five microgram standard and then applied that standard to all industries despite the fact that some of them almost certainly would not
suffer substantial revenue or profit loss under the one microgram
standard. Infeasibility in one industry may act as an effective veto of
regulation of other industries.
3. Technological feasibility.
Technological feasibility generally means technological availability. For example, suppose that industrial practices cause certain inhalable toxins to enter the air. The agency may consider ordering firms to
adopt measures that are already technologically possible-for example, ventilation fans or respirators that are already used by firms
(though not necessarily those in the industry)."' Although some com(SOC) System, online at http://www.bl&gov/soc/home.htm (visited Nov 15, 2009) (explaining that
the SOC divides workers into over 820 occupations "for the purpose of collecting, calculating, or
disseminating data").
175 See 71 Fed Reg at 10226 (cited in note 63) (using "application groups" to group "firms
where employees are exposed . . . when performing a particular function" since similar control
technologies would be appropriate within the group); 63 Fed Reg at 18504 (cited in note 102)
(revising the subcategorization scheme to better reflect the actual processes used).
176 The literature has dwelt on the ambiguity of this term. A safety measure that is cheap in
one type of plant may be a little or a great deal more expensive in another type of plant because
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mentators believe that agencies may issue "technology-forcing" regulations'" -regulations that oblige firms to develop new, more effective
technologies-in practice courts have placed a heavy burden on agencies to prove that such technologies can indeed be developed, and as a
result agencies rarely issue technology-forcing regulations."
Thus, the relevant "cost" for purposes of determining economic
feasibility is the cost of adopting available technology for the purpose
of reducing or eliminating a risk. Presumably, the most restrictive
technology must be used, consistent only with economic feasibility. An
agency can also reduce the risk to zero simply by banning the production process that causes the risk. For example, if a toxin is used in
painting cars, the agency could order the firm not to use the toxinagain subject to the economic feasibility rule. Option TCF for the paper mill regulation did just this.
The consequence is that the agency must choose between mandating safety precautions that already exist and banning the substance
altogether. But banning the substance altogether would always be
worse than demanding technological innovation that renders it harmless, given that firms would always retain the option of discontinuing
use of the substance if such innovation would be too expensive.
The effect of the technological feasibility condition is not only to
protect firms from regulations that might drive them out of business
(because they cannot develop a new technology in cost-justified fashion), but also to entrench old technologies."' Although feasibility
analysis does not eliminate firms' existing incentives to develop safety
of differences in the physical configurations of the plants. As others have discussed this issue in
detail, we ignore it. See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 Colum J Envir L 171, 173

(1988) ("Uniform [ ] requirements waste many billions of dollars annually by ignoring variations
among plants and industries in the costs of reducing pollution and by ignoring geographic variations in pollution effects.").
177 See, for example, Note, Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 Yale L J
1713,1718-19 (1979).
178 Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 13-15 (cited in note 1). Many feasibility-triggering
statutes explicitly require "available" or "demonstrated" technology, see, for example, 42 USC
§ 7475(a)(4) (requiring limitations based on the "best available control technology for each
pollutant"), and courts have interpreted this language to mean that it has already been tested
and approved for use.
179 Sometimes agencies will accompany feasibility-based regulations with other regulations
that provide incentives for innovation. See, for example, 63 Fed Reg at 18593-608 (cited in
note 102) (introducing the Voluntary Advanced Technology Incentives Program in paper mills).
In addition, there are some recent examples of courts supporting agencies' selection of control
technolgies that have only been adopted in a few facilities. See, for example, American Iron &
Steel Institute v OSHA, 939 F2d 975, 983-84 (DC Cir 1991) (approving OSHA's feasibility determination based on evidence that a single company was able to meet the standard).
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precautions that are cheaper than, but just as effective as, existing
safety precautions, it does not enhance these incentives. The reason is
that feasibility analysis gives firms no incentive to take into account
the costs they impose on third parties. In fact, firms have incentives to
avoid developing new technologies. Newer, more effective technologies might make otherwise infeasible regulations feasible, allowing
agencies to impose additional regulation.
4. Economic feasibility.
In OSHA's formulation, economic feasibility exists when two
conditions are satisfied: the cost of the safety technology is less than
10 percent of profits, and the cost is less than 1 percent of revenues.
Commentators have generally interpreted feasibility in terms of plant
closures, which were also the focus of EPA's paper mill regulation."'
We address each of these approaches.
a) Revenues. It is straightforward that the revenue component of
the feasibility rule introduces a market distortion in favor of small
firms, that is, firms with low revenues, compared to large firms."' To see
why, suppose that the technologically feasible safety precaution in the
car-painting industry is the installation of a ventilation system. Suppose that one firm does high-end work, with high revenues and high
costs, and another firm does low-end work, with low revenues and low
costs-but are otherwise identical. Suppose that the first firm has revenues of $10 million and the second firm has revenues of $1 million,
and that the ventilation system costs $50,000. If the firms are defined
as belonging to different industries, then only the first firm must install
the ventilation system. If the firms are defined as belonging to the
same industry, then both firms must either install the system or not
install the system, depending on the overall cost structure of the industry. Yet there is no reason to make the ventilation system depend
on the size of the firm.
18o See Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 3 (cited in note 1). See also notes 141-43 and
accompanying text.
181 Note also that "under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., as
amended by [the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub
L No 104-121, 110 Stat 8471, EPA generally is required to conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis
describing the impact of the rule on small entities." 63 Fed Reg at 18611 (cited in note 102). In
other words RFA requires a separate analysis of small businesses. In some OSHA regulations, it
has used a 1 percent/5 percent limit for small businesses instead of the 1 percent/10 percent
threshold. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Assigned Protection Factors, 71 Fed

Reg 50122, 50157 (2006); OSHA, Fire Protection in Shipyard Employment, 69 Fed Reg 55668,

55701 (2004).
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Firms become large to exploit economies of scale. A rule that systematically disfavors large firms discourages firms from becoming
large in the first place. The loss of economies of scale will drive up
costs, hurting consumers and shareholders, without producing any offsetting benefits.
It is possible that, in some industries, the revenue rule is harmless
because the costs of safety precautions increase with revenue. Suppose, for example, that the technologically feasible precaution is for
workers to use respirators, and that higher revenue firms have more
workers. In this case, the revenue rule does not create inefficiency because larger firms do not suffer relative to small firms. However, there
is no reason to believe this relationship holds in all cases.
b) Profits. The profit component of the economic feasibility rule
protects low-profit industries from regulation. To understand the economic effect of such a rule, we need to understand why some industries enjoy higher profits than others. There are a few possibilities.
First, the higher-profit industry might face a higher level of risk, and
investors demand the higher profits to compensate them for taking on
this extra level of risk.'" If this is the case, then regulations that disfavor higher-profit firms will simply reduce their profits and cause investors to flee. Despite the apparent small impact of the regulation on
profits (that is, less than 10 percent), firms will close or otherwise reduce their risk-taking activity. The effect will be felt as lower returns
for shareholders in the short run, but as higher costs for consumers or
the elimination of desirable goods in the long run.
Second, some firms enjoy short-term profits because their managers spot market opportunities that competitors miss. The short-term
profits thus serve as a signal of unexploited demand, attracting capital
and eventually driving down prices, to the benefit of consumers."' The
profit rule is simply a tax on such profits, which will reduce incentives
to exploit these opportunities. Consumers lose as a result.
Third, the higher-profit industry may benefit from natural or artificial market restrictions, such as economies of scale, regulations, or
illegal anticompetitive behavior. In the last case, the profit rule will
reduce the profits of firms without having any negative effect, assuming that the rents enjoyed by investors are greater than 1 percent of
the total return. At the same time, the profit rule may interact in undesirable ways with other areas of the law. Intellectual property law
1

See William E Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and CapitalMarkets 84-85 (McGraw-Hill 1970).

183 See Arthur L. Faubel, Principles of Economics: An Elementary Textbook 73-80 (Har-

court, Brace 1932).
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grants firms limited monopolies in order to encourage innovation, yet
these firms become vulnerable under the feasibility test. Antitrust law
is the proper method for policing anticompetitive behavior; a rule that
generally penalizes high-profit firms would be in tension with antitrust
law's more nuanced approach.
c) Plants,jobs, and firms. Why does OSHA consider revenues

and profits? An alternative approach, illustrated by EPA's paper mill
regulation, is to determine whether a regulation closes plants, destroys
jobs, or bankrupts firms.'" Scholarly defenders of feasibility analysis
also focus on plant closures, job losses, and bankruptcies.' Which is
the right standard for feasibility?
These standards are obviously not the same. A regulation that reduces the revenues of an industry does not necessarily reduce its profits. The regulation could cause some firms to shut down, resulting in
greater business for other firms and generating rents for them in the
short run. A regulation could also reduce profits without reducing
revenues just by increasing costs. OSHA requires both conditions to
be satisfied, but why exactly? What is so important about revenues
and profits? One might think that OSHA seeks to protect the capitalists, not the workers.
Revenues and profits could be proxies for plant shutdowns. If
revenues and profits decline, then plants may be shut down and jobs
lost. But revenues and profits could decline without any plants being
shut down: the regulation could just cause firms to fire workers while
keeping plants open with smaller staffs. In any event, why use proxies if
the real concern is plant closings or job losses? Agencies can estimate
these outcomes directly-EPA did just this in the paper mill regulation-and can evaluate regulations' feasibility on the basis of them.
But plant closures and job losses are not the same thing, either. A
regulation that causes plant closures could have no effect on job losses
if firms just reassign workers to plants that remain open. Or consider a
regulation that shuts one out of fifty plants, with the result that one
hundred jobs are lost, and a regulation that shuts zero plants but causes ten job losses in all fifty plants, for a total of five hundred job losses.
Should the agency focus on plant closings (perhaps because of the
effect on the community) or job losses (because in the end this is what
matters)? Workers are harmed when they lose jobs, and people in the
See text accompanying notes 140-62.
See, for example, Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 3 (cited in note 1) (arguing that
avoiding plant closures and unemployment should be the only countervailing consideration to
health and safety under feasibility analysis).
18
185
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surrounding community could be hurt if job losses are concentrated in
one plant. Plant closings might be thought of as a proxy for job losses,
but agencies are capable of estimating job losses directly; EPA did this
as well. There is no need to employ any sort of proxy.
Finally, should agencies instead interpret feasibility to refer to
bankruptcies? Consider an industry with fifty plants. One firm owns
forty-nine plants and another firm owns one plant. If a regulation
bankrupts the first firm, the consequences might seem more serious
than if it bankrupts the second firm, because the first firm owns more
plants. On the other hand, bankruptcy does not force firms to shut
down plants they own. If the plants remain profitable, the firms will
just sell them, and no one will lose a job. If that is the case, why restrict
regulation to avoid bankruptcy?
These different rules would cause firms to act in different ways,
none good. If firms anticipate that agencies will spare them from regulation when necessary to minimize plant shutdowns, then they will
invest in larger numbers of smaller plants. If agencies spare firms
when necessary to minimize bankruptcy, then firms will maintain thin
capitalizations by distributing dividends to a greater extent than they
would otherwise. If agencies spare firms when necessary to minimize
job loss, then firms will overhire. Of course, if the regulations have
only limited effect, then these distortions will be only marginal, but by
the same token the regulations will do little good.
d) Path dependency and time inconsistency. Suppose that an in-

dustry produces hazardous emissions that kill ten people per year. The
industry has revenues of $1 million, costs of $900,000, and profits of
$100,000. Under some versions of the feasibility approach, EPA
should choose a level of regulation that reduces emissions to the maximum extent consistent with avoiding widespread plant shutdowns or
bankruptcies. Let us stipulate that a Regulation X that costs $90,000
would save nine lives and avoid shutdowns and bankruptcies, leaving
the industry as a whole with profits of $10,000.
Next year, scientists discover that this same industry emits another hazardous substance. This substance kills one hundred people per
year. A Regulation Y that costs $50,000 would save ninety-nine of
these people but would also bankrupt the industry, which now has
profits of only $10,000. Accordingly, feasibility analysis would forbid
the agency from promulgating this regulation.
If scientists had discovered the second substance first, EPA could
have issued Regulation Y, which saves more people at lower cost than
Regulation X does. This path dependence reflects another form of
arbitrariness that feasibility analysis produces. By contrast, CBA
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would require either or both regulations to be issued, regardless of the
order in which they are introduced, as long as they are cost-justified
(and regardless of whether they bankrupt the industry).6
Agencies can reduce the risk of path dependency by refusing to
issue regulations that consume a large portion of an industry's profits.
As we have seen, OSHA will not issue regulations that reduce profits
by more than 10 percent. In this case, path dependence will result only
if OSHA issues at least nine regulations that amount to more than
90 percent of profits. But the price of avoiding the risk of path dependence is high. OSHA must refrain from issuing cost-justified regulations that produce high costs but even higher benefits.
5. Summary.
We can put the pieces of our analysis together. According to economic analysis, a firm should engage in a precaution when the marginal benefits (in terms of reduced risk of harm to workers and others) exceed the marginal costs.' 7 Feasibility analysis deviates from this
approach. We can divide the deviations into two categories -cases
where feasibility analysis results in underregulation (relative to economic optimality) and cases where it results in overregulation. MAs
before, we focus on OSHA's approach.
Feasibility analysis results in underregulation of industrial sectors
where:
* A low-cost precaution technology can be cheaply developed
but does not currently exist;
* The industry has low revenues or precaution costs do not increase with revenue; or
* The industry has low profits.
Feasibility analysis results in overregulation of industrial sectors
where:

186 Path dependency could be introduced if the CBA takes into account the hardship from
job loss; however, as noted earlier, these costs are generally ignored for largely sensible reasons.
See text accompanying notes 170-75.
187

See, for example, Richard J. Butler, The Economics of Social Insurance and Employee

Benefits 125 (Springer 1999).
188 Others have noted that feasibility analysis leads to under- and overregulation relative to
CBA. See, for example, Farber, Eco-Pragmatism at 78 (cited in note 11); Lester B. Lave, The
Strategy of Social Regulation: DecisionFrameworksfor Policy 14-15 (Brookings 1981).
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* The technologically feasible regulation creates costs greater
than the benefits from risk reduction; and
* The industry has high revenues, precaution costs increase with
revenue, or the industry has high profits.
Further, the constraint that requires agencies to choose between
banning a substance or activity, or imposing a technologically feasible
precaution, prevents agencies from requiring optimal technological
innovation. And the industry-level analysis creates further distortions.
If the technologically feasible regulation is also economically optimal,
then a narrow definition of industry (down to the firm level) inefficiently spares low-revenue and low-profit firms, while a broad definition inefficiently spares all firms in low-revenue and low-profit "industries." Finally, feasibility analysis is path dependent and can result in
underregulation if more hazardous activities are discovered after regulations addressing less hazardous activities are issued.
Under EPA's approach, other distortions occur. A cost-justified regulation that shuts down plants, causes job loss, or sends firms into bankruptcy is barred, and a regulation that excessively reduces risks and hence
harms consumers but does not have these other effects is permitted.
We should immediately note that one might defend feasibility
analysis on grounds other than those of welfare economics. It might
seem too obvious to state that any decision procedure other than
CBA will promote social welfare less well than CBA does. But matters
are considerably more complicated than this.
Initially, it is important to be clear about how feasibility analysis
deviates from CBA. If these differences seem intuitively appropriate,
then we might believe that these deviations are justified. As we see,
defenders of feasibility analysis believe that one advantage is that it
focuses on plant closures-which can cause concentrated hardshipwhereas CBA ignores them.
Further, we might agree that social welfare maximization is the
appropriate normative goal, and argue about whether CBA or feasibility analysis is the better decision procedure for obtaining that goal.
CBA is an imperfect decision procedure;" feasibility analysis might be
better. Indeed, defenders of feasibility analysis make this argument.'"

189 Hahn, 71 U Chi L Rev at 1048 (cited in note 9) (conceding that CBA provides only an
"imperfect" account of "net benefits," but maintaining that it is nonetheless superior to any other
alternative).
190 See text accompanying notes 199-201.

Against FeasibilityAnalysis

2010]

699

Finally, we might instead reject social welfare maximization as the
goal and argue that agencies should pursue some other normative
goal that feasibility analysis happens to promote. Defenders of feasibility analysis make this argument as well."
We turn to these arguments in the next Parts.
Feasibility Analysis as a Welfarist Decision Procedure

B.

Feasibility analysis is a decision procedure -that is, an instrument
or means that agencies use for the purpose of achieving a normative
goal.'" The normative goal itself might be reflected in the statute or, if
the statute is ambiguous, in the policy of the agency or the executive
branch. Let us first suppose that the relevant statute or policy sets the
goal of advancing social welfare.
A decision procedure is just a type of rule. Rules (compared to
standards) reduce decision costs but raise error costs.' The choice
between rules and standards depends on the tradeoff between these
costs. In the current setting, agencies could be asked to apply a standard-maximize social welfare-but most people agree that such a

standard provides inadequate guidance, thus generating high decision
costs. The literature discusses various rule-like procedures that reduce
decision costs, including CBA, quality-adjusted life-year analysis, riskrisk analysis, and feasibility analysis."' CBA is a "wide" rule that allows
the analyst to take into account a range of costs that regulations impose on people.'95 Risk-risk analysis, by contrast, is narrower: it considers only the effects on lives.'" Social welfare maximization favors wider approaches, to the extent that decision costs can be minimized, be-

191 See note 224.
192 For a discussion of decision procedures in this context, see Adler and Posner, New
Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 63-68 (cited in note 9) (distinguishing decision procedures, such as CBA, from moral criteria or normative goals, such as welfare maximization).
193

Fredrick E. Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based

Decisionmaking in Law and in Life 148-49 (Oxford 1991) (noting that rules, while sometimes
more efficient, "commit a decision-making process to some number of errors"). See also generally Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards,42 Duke L J 557 (1992) (describing a general theory of
rules and standards).
194 Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 73-76 (cited in note 9).
195We refer to CBA as ordinarily practiced, which assumes the standard economic welfarist
approach-subjective preference satisfaction-but in practice ignores certain other-regarding
preferences. For a discussion, see id.
196 Id at 76 (explaining that the purpose of "risk-risk" analysis is to "minimize the total
number of premature deaths," taking into consideration both the risks associated with the "targated hazard" and risks associated with the "effort to mitigate"). See also W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators,63 U Chi L Rev 1423, 1436-55 (1996).
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cause people's welfare depends on a range of activities and conditions,
not just (for example) the bare fact of being alive. At the same time,
CBA minimizes decision costs through the magic of quantification.
Once valuations are obtained from the marketplace and surveys-fixed
costs that can be spread across multiple regulations -decisions are relatively automatic. Judgment must be used, but standard procedures have
developed,'" which improves monitoring and thus limits bias. "
The idea that feasibility analysis is a welfarist decision procedure-that it is justified because it promotes well-being more effectively than CBA or any other decision procedure does-is not fanciful.
David Driesen, the leading defender of feasibility analysis, appears to
take this view, or at least certain elements of his defense are consistent
with this view. In particular, he stresses three welfarist virtues of feasibility analysis: that it ensures that agencies regulate industrial
processes that create harms that are difficult to monetize;'" that it ensures that regulation does not impose concentrated harms on workers
and spreads the costs of regulation among consumers;M and that it provides clear guidance for agencies, thus avoiding arbitrary and inconsistent regulatory outcomes." Let us consider these arguments in turn.
1. Difficulties with monetization.
Various substances used in industrial processes cause harm to
humans. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to quantify and monetize
those harms. Regulators may suspect that a substance harms humans
because it causes cancer in animals but lack epidemiological proof
that the substance also causes cancer in humans."' Regulators might
have evidence that the substance harms some people (for example,
cigarette smokers) and might believe, based on experience, that such a
197 See, for example, Christopher Fuller, Note, Congressional Pre-commitment to Curb
Discretionary Spending: A Proposal to Apply Executive Cost-Benefit Principles to Legislative
Appropriations in Order to Discipline Discretionary Spending, 33 Seton Hall Leg J 499, 516-18

(2009) (discussing the use of "scorecards" to quantify costs and benefits, which make it possible
to track agency decisions and performance).
198 We discuss bias in Part III.D.
19 Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 37-38 (cited in note 1).
2
Id at 38.
201 Id at 41-48.
202

See, for example, EPA, Oxygenates in Water: Critical Information and Research Needs 1-3

(1998), online at httpl/www.epa.gov/ncea/pdfs/oxy-h2o.pdf (visited Nov 15, 2009); EPA, Methyl
Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE); Advance Notice of Intent to Initiate Rulemaking under the Toxic
Substances Control Act to Eliminate or Limit the Use of MTBE as a Fuel Additive in Gasoline, 65

Fed Reg 16094,16094 (2000) (issuing an advance notice of proposed rulemaking regarding regulation of the use of MTBE).
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substance will be generally harmful, but lack evidence that it causes
harm to other people.tm And even when it is clear that substances
cause harms, many harms are difficult to monetize. Some substances
might cause bad odors or unsightly air pollution that does not cause
harm to health but bothers people;2m it is not easy to monetize these
harms. Medical costs can be used when the condition is curable, but
many conditions are chronic and bothersome but not deadly; how
does one attach a money value to these experiences? And what if rich
people and poor people are affected by the same hazard: should the
well-being of the rich count more because they are willing to pay a
higher amount (by virtue of their wealth alone) to avoid it? Finally,
there is the vexed question of valuing avoided deaths. 5
Cost-benefit analysts have struggled with these problems and
proposed a range of imaginative methods for estimating and monetizing harms.m But many critics of CBA believe that these estimates are
arbitrary or too low, and that the burden of collecting and analyzing
data builds in an unjustified anti-regulatory bias. The chromium and
paper mill regulations were typical in this regard. OSHA believed that
exposure to chromium causes asthma, nasal irritation, and gastrointestinal ulcers but did not include these harms in its cost-benefit analysis
because of data limitations. = EPA believed that paper mill discharges
cause various non-cancer illnesses but did not include these harms for
the same reason. 209 Feasibility analysis avoids this problem by starting
with the assumption that known risks of harm should be reduced as
far as possible, consistent with technological and economic feasibility.
Although one must identify harmful substances-so, again, lack of
available data could still hinder regulations -once one has done this, it
is not necessary to calculate precise risks and to monetize harms.
203 See, for example, Ronald J. Rychlak, Cards and Dice in Smoky Rooms: Tobacco Bans
and Modern Casinos,57 Drake L Rev 467,482-90 (2009).
204 See, for example, 40 CFR § 81.403 (establishing, among other places, Grand Canyon
National Park as a location where visibility is an important value).
205 Many of these criticisms originated in Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis at 36-40 (cited in
note 10) (discussing the difficulty of assigning a value to nonmarket things, and criticizing the notion
that, by observing risk-taking behavior, we can place a value on avoided deaths). For a recent compilation, see Ackerman and Heinzerling, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1567-68,1574-75 (cited in note 10).
206 See, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, FatalTradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for
Risk 34-50 (Oxford 1992). For a compilation of academic efforts aimed at addressing this prob-

lem, see generally W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of Statistical Life: A Critical
Review of Market Estimates throughout the World, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty 5 (2003); Jerry A.
Hausman, ed, Contingent Valuation:A CriticalAssessment (Elsevier 1993).
207
208
209

See, for example, Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 4 (cited in note 1).
See Part II.A.
See Part II.B.
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This advantage of feasibility analysis, however, comes at a significant cost. If there were no technological and economic feasibility constraint, feasibility analysis would require agencies to reduce all risks of
harm to zero. Virtually all industrial practices create risks of harm for
workers and for other people exposed to a firm's pollution. Any serious effort to reduce risks to zero would require shutting down the
economy (in the process no doubt making life less healthy and more
dangerous).210 Feasibility analysis avoids this outcome by stipulating that
the economy should not be shut down. But it does not explain how far
regulation should go: at what point should we regard suppression of
economic activity as too great to justify a regulation that reduces risk?
As we have seen, the agencies have failed to answer this question.
OSHA's approach in the chromium regulation is clearly arbitrary, but
that is only because it is so specific; any similar approach that refers
more vaguely to avoiding plant closings is equally arbitrary. A regulation that substantially reduces risks of harm should be issued even if it
closes many plants. A regulation that reduces risks of harm very little,
while imposing very high costs on consumers, should not be issued
even if it does not close any plants.
A further point is that if the problem with CBA is that it ignores
real harms (as opposed to harms for which there is no evidence because they do not exist), then multipliers and other simple devices can
be used to improve analysis. The government could conduct periodic
retrospective studies of regulations to see whether the cost-benefit
analyses that justified them turned out to be accurate.21 If these retrospective studies reveal that CBA systematically underestimates the
benefits of regulation by (say) a factor of two, then agencies should be
directed to multiply their estimates of benefits by two whenever they
conduct CBA for new regulations.
2. Plant closings.
Driesen argues that feasibility analysis ensures that regulations
do not impose excessively concentrated hardships on workers and
communities that depend on the employment opportunities offered

210 Feasibility analysis emerged in part because an earlier effort to reduce risks to zero was
abandoned. See Ackerman and Stewart, 13 Colum J Envir L at 175 (cited in note 176).
211 In fact, scholars do this routinely. See generally Winston Harrington, Richard D. Mor-

genstern, and Peter Nelson, On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J Pol Analysis &

Mgmt 297 (2000) (performing a study comparing the direct costs of regulations to the original
cost estimates).
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by industrial plants.2 His argument centers on the distributional consequences of regulation.213 Concentrated economic costs are more likely to diminish welfare because of the diminishing marginal value of
money; it is more harmful (in welfare terms) for one person to lose
$10,000 than for 10,000 people each to lose $1. Driesen favors environmental regulation in general because the types of harms caused by
pollution-lung cancer, for instance-are borne by a few individuals,

rather than spread across many.21 He supports feasibility analysis in
particular because it largely ignores widespread costs borne by consumers (more on this later) and concentrates only on avoiding unemployment-a harm borne by comparatively few individuals.215
As an initial matter, the focus on avoiding concentrated harms
does not justify feasibility analysis in a broad range of cases. For instance, suppose that feasibility analysis prevents OSHA from lowering
the Cr(VI) exposure limit to 1 gg/m' because of the threat of plant
closings. The cost of implementing a weaker exposure limit, rather
than this stricter limit, will fall on the workers who are stricken with
lung cancer as a result. The same is true for environmental regulations:
feasibility analysis may force regulators to trade the health (and lives)
of a few individuals for the jobs of a greater number of workers. If the
goal of feasibility analysis is to avoid concentrated harms, preventing
job loss at the expense of allowing a greater number of serious illnesses makes little sense. And this is not even to mention the fact that
regulations that do not cause "widespread plant closings" could nonetheless lead to widespread layoffs -that is, layoffs from plants that are
not entirely shut down.
In addition, in an effort to emphasize larger concentrated costs
over smaller dispersed ones, feasibility analysis errs by valuing those
small costs at zero. The complete disregard of costs other than those
related to job loss is deeply puzzling from a welfarist perspective.216
Consider an average person, P. P has a job, breathes the air, eats food,
drives a car, raises a family, purchases entertainment, pays for medical
212 Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 37 (cited in note 1) (tying the plant closing standard
to a fear of excessive, concentrated layoffs).
213 See id at 38.
214 See id.
215 See id at 36-38.
216 See John D. Graham, Saving Lives through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U
Pa L Rev 395, 445 (2008); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
Colum L Rev 1613, 1694 (1995) (observing that technology-based standards both under- and
overregulate, leaving some communities relatively unprotected from toxic materials while imposing tremendous cost inefficiencies upon others).
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insurance, and so forth. The feasibility test ensures that a regulation
takes account of P's interest in keeping her job, in having a safe job,
and in breathing the air, but ignores her interests in having cheap and
healthy food, maintaining her car, buying goods for her family, and
having access to inexpensive entertainment. Why should regulations
take account of health, safety, and job loss, but nothing else? This same
worker is also a consumer; regulations that raise costs for consumers
hurt this worker just as polluted air does. Indeed, the regulation could
lower P's medical insurance premium by reducing risks that she faces,
but at the same time, by raising the cost of goods, leave her with less
disposable income for purchasing medical insurance in the first place.
These effects cannot be evaluated if the effect of a regulation on the
cost of goods is ignored. But that is exactly what the feasibility test does.
The approach of feasibility analysis thus creates significant problems of over- and underregulation. Overregulation occurs because
feasibility analysis ignores the cost of regulations to consumers-the
costs they incur because prices rise or products disappear from the
market. Underregulation occurs because feasibility analysis tolerates
dangerous industrial practices if regulation would shut down plants.
As we have seen, OSHA's approach to Cr(VI) creates other perverse
incentives: to reduce the size of firms, to avoid taking entrepreneurial
risks, and so forth.217 EPA's approach would also cause distortionslarger plants, thinner capitalization, and so on.21 CBA, by contrast,
takes into account all the costs that regulations impose on consumers,
as well as the benefits.
It is true that CBA has traditionally ignored the effect of regulation on employment. The reason is that economists tend to assume
that labor markets will adjust in response to changes in the cost of
inputs. Regulations raise the cost of inputs, but these costs can increase for exogenous reasons; these are simply the facts of life for any
employer. In classical labor market models, firms will enter and exit
the market in response to these shocks, and workers will lose their
jobs and obtain jobs at other firms.219 The cost to workers, if there is
one, is transitional only, and most cost-benefit analysts probably regard them as small relative to the regulatory benefits and costs to con217
218

See Part III.A.4.
See Part II.B.

219

Rajshree Agarwal and Michael Gort, The Evolution of Markets and Entry, Exit, and

Survival of Firms, 78 Rev Econ & Stat 489,489 (1996); Daniel S. Hamermesh, Wolter H. I. Hassink, and Jan C. van Ours, Job Turnover and Labor Turnover: A Taxonomy of Employment Dy-

namics, 41/42 Annales d'Economie et de Statistique 21, 37-38 (1996) (discussing the flow of
workers between firms).
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sumers. In addition, workers can self-insure against job loss, and governments often provide training and other assistance, which reduces
the transition costs. But if all of this is a mistake -if it is appropriate to
take into account the hardship costs to workers who lose their jobs then CBA can easily accommodate these costs. Analysts would simply
estimate the effect of a regulation on employment, and multiply that
number by the estimated costs of transition or unemployment for the
workers in question. In doing so, analysts would take account of macroeconomic and other conditions that affect the ability of workers to
find new jobs.
If CBA errs when translating dollars into welfare, this problem
can be cured much more accurately and intelligently within the
framework of CBA. Regulators could simply apply multipliers to
highly concentrated benefits in accordance with economists' best estimates of individuals' welfare functions. The right approach cannot be
to simply reduce some values in the equation to zero.
3. Clarity.
We have mentioned the many vague concepts used in feasibility
analysis.' Neither technological nor economic feasibility are welldefined concepts; the definition of industry is also largely arbitrary.
Technological feasibility could mean technology that exists or technology that could be cheaply developed. Given problems of proof,
agencies opted for the first definition, but even then faced challenges
from industries that pointed out that technology that might work in
some types of plants does not work in other types-or works only if it
is modified, which requires further costs. We have discussed the problems of economic feasibility: the OSHA approach in the chromium
rule is arbitrary; the EPA approach is indefinite.
The real problem is not the vagueness of words-words are always vague-but the absence of a theoretically coherent normative
basis for feasibility analysis, a theory the analyst can draw upon in order to flesh out these terms in specific regulatory contexts. CBA also
uses vague terms, and requires some choices that are relatively arbitrary. But if the analyst keeps the overall goal of CBA in mind-the
promotion of public well-being-then the ambiguities can be resolved.
Feasibility analysis's notion of balancing employment with health and
220 See, for example, text accompanying notes 167-75. Other critics of feasibility analysis
have also taken issue with the method's essential vagueness. See, for example, Sunstein, Risk and
Reason at 216-18 (cited in note 3).
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safety provides no similar guidance because it offers no theoretical
way to determine the correct balance.
Driesen argues that feasibility analysis provides clear guidance,
pointing out that in practice regulations tend to avoid plant closings or
revenue losses of more than 0.01 to 2 percent,2' and that agencies
usually do not require firms to develop new technologies.m But this
argument confuses the supposed analytic benefits of feasibility analysis and the ways in which agencies actually use it. If Driesen's account
is correct, it appears that agencies use the test in the most conservative
way possible in order to avoid litigation or minimize the risk of harm.
But that only suggests that agencies are massively underregulating
when they employ feasibility analysis.
Our own survey of feasibility analyses by agencies provides little
evidence that this test guides or constrains agencies. As the chromium
and paper mill regulations illustrate, the agencies' use of the test
seems to be ad hoc. The explanations are unpersuasive, the presumptions or rules they use arbitrary, and the recourse to exceptions frequent and inadequately justified. Agencies' record with CBA is not
perfect, either,2 and perhaps agencies could improve their feasibility
analysis with practice and guidance from OMB. But on the evidence
so far, the claim that feasibility analysis provides meaningful guidance
is unsupported.
To be sure, feasibility analysis can be made arbitrarily specific,
thus driving decision costs down. The OSHA chromium rule reflects
such an attempt. But the error costs become huge. A regulation that
could save many lives at relatively low cost becomes impossible because the industry is small or poor. Alternatively, feasibility analysis
can remain vague, more of a standard, as in the EPA paper mill approach. Now, however, it becomes difficult to understand why EPA
drew the line it did-one mill shutdown rather than two. At the same
time, EPA continues to ignore costs that matter to people, such as the

Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 17 n 85 (cited in note 1).
Id at 16.
M See Robert W. Hahn and Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the Government Do CostBenefit Analysis? *23 (AEI-Brookings Institution Working Paper No 04-01, Jan 2004), online at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfnabstract-id=495462 (visited May 5, 2010); Robert W.
2

22

Hahn, et al, Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Ex-

ecutive Order 12,866,23 Harv J L & Pub Pol 859, 877 (2000). See also generally Richard D. Morgenstern, ed, Economic Analysis at EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact (Resources for the Future
1997). Other sources are listed in Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at

214-15 n 35 (cited in note 9).
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increase in the price of paper. So even with high decision costs, error
costs remain high as well.
C. Does Feasibility Analysis Have an Alternative Normative Basis?
Let us return to the idea that feasibility analysis has an alterna22
If it is not welfarist, what would that basis be?
tive normative basis.m
Philosophers distinguish consequentialist and deontological approaches to ethics. The consequentialist believes that acts should be
evaluated on the basis of the goodness of their consequences; the
deontologist believes that acts should be evaluated on the basis of
their own quality-for example, one should not (presumptively) lie
even when lying has good consequences. Within consequentialism,
welfarism is only one version: one could care about consequences for
people's welfare, but one could also care about consequences in other
ways-for people's virtue, for example. And then welfarism can be
defined in various ways. Welfare might refer to positive subjective experience or mental states; the satisfaction of desires (or of certain desires); or objective goods (such as education).m
Feasibility analysis clearly does not reflect deontological thinking;
we have argued that it also does not reflect welfarism in any
straightforward sense.2 Welfarism normally suggests that all aspects of
a person's well-being be taken into account, not just aspects of wellbeing related to employment, health, and safety.'" Perhaps, though,
feasibility analysis can be based on a version of welfarism that stresses
these conditions over all others. This could be attached to incommensurability worries-that certain values should not be traded off each
other, that it is wrong for an agency to hold off regulating a substance
224 This was suggested by Shapiro and Schroeder, 32 Harv Envir L Rev at 459-62 (cited in
note 3); Driesen, 32 BC Envir Aff L Rev at 49 (cited in note 1), albeit without any clear indication of what that theory would be.
225 See Amartya Sen, On Ethics & Economics 40-51 (Basil Blackwell 1987) (considering
and analyzing these possibilities); James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and
Moral Importance 1-20 (Oxford 1986) (same); L.W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness,and Ethics 1-20
(Clarendon 1996) (same); Adler and Posner, New Foundationsof Cost-Benefit Analysis at 28-39
(cited in note 9) (discussing existing accounts of welfare, such as mental-state and objective good
accounts, and proposing a "restricted, preference-based account of well-being"); John Bronsteen,
Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness,98 Georgetown L J *1-2
(forthcoming 2010), online at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1397843 (visited Nov 15, 2009) (arguing that "well-being is neither preference-satisfaction nor naturefulfillment but rather happiness or positive effect-feeling good").
226 See Part III.B.
227 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The CapabilitiesApproach
116-17 (Cambridge 1993).
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that damages workers' lungs so that consumer products will be a few
dollars cheaper.
Most economists reject this argument but philosophers have takm One school of thought holds that goods contribute to
en it seriously.2
well-being only if the agent would rationally prefer those goods under
full information; others argue that well-being is objective, in the sense
that people's well-being depends on their ability to engage in certain
activities regardless of whether they actually desire to engage in these
activities. ' Martha Nussbaum, for example, suggests the following
objective list of qualities that comprise welfare: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical
reason; affiliation (including the goods of both friendship and selfrespect); play; other species; and control over one's environment (including both political rights and property rights).2 ' Other accounts
emphasize different goods but are largely consistent with Nussbaum's
objectivist approach.
Feasibility analysis advances bodily health and bodily integrity
but it does not take into account the other goods, with the result that
regulations will favor only two of the eight items on Nussbaum's list
and, similarly, a small portion of the goods on other philosophers' lists.
Affiliation requires access to transportation so that one can visit
friends, attend political meetings, and the like. Control over one's environment presupposes the affordability of goods that one needs in
order to manipulate the environment. Tradeoffs must be made. Sometimes these tradeoffs are tragic-people are forced to choose between
goods about which they have fundamental entitlements.2 3 Sometimes
they are not. If a person chooses to move from a very clean rural area
to a very slightly polluted city in order to take advantage of cultural
opportunities, but in doing so takes a miniscule risk of early death, this
See, for example, Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 44-64 (Harvard 1993).
229 See Griffin, Well-Being at 75-92 (cited in note 225); Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and
228

Ethics at 200-17 (cited in note 225).
230 See Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics at 27-34 (cited in note 225). See, for example, Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics 111-12 (Cambridge 1901); Sen, On Ethics and Eco-

nomics at 60 (cited in note 225).
231 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development at 78-80 (cited in note 227). Nussbaum
does not advance her view as a comprehensive account of welfare but as a list of central political
goods that people with different views of welfare should endorse for political purposes. We use
her list for illustration only.
232 Adler and Posner, New Foundationsof Cost-Benefit Analysis at 31-32 (cited in note 9)
(describing other objective conceptions of welfare).
233 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis,

29 J Legal Stud 1005,1007 (2000).
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is hardly a tragedy. In either case, a regulatory decision procedure that
requires agencies to focus on health and bodily integrity to the exclusion of all else would not advance people's well-being.
If standard economic accounts of well-being are to be rejected
and replaced with philosophical accounts that distrust (some of) people's
choices, that may be reasonable, but then the challenge is to invent a decision procedure that reflects the proper interpretation of well-being. An
objective or limited desire-based approach will exclude certain goods and
activities that people care about but not those that feasibility analysis
ignores. CBA will continue to be appropriate as long as a sufficient portion of consumer choices continue to be respected under the alternative
approach. If not, it can be modified so that people's preferences for objectively bad or rationally undesirable goods are ignored."
But our goal is not to defend CBA. It is certainly possible that this
decision procedure is not consistent with the correct theory of well-being.
It is, however, consistent with a range of reasonable conceptions of wellbeing. Feasibility analysis is not. No attempt to reverse-engineer a theory
of well-being that justifies feasibility analysis has been successful.
D. The Politics of Feasibility Analysis
If our analysis is correct so far, feasibility analysis does not necessarily have a pro- or anti-regulatory bias. In some sectors it results in
overregulation; in others it results in underregulation. It is impossible
to say anything more general. Yet in political debates, proregulatory
groups generally favor feasibility analysis, while anti-regulatory
groups favor CBA. What explains this pattern?
We do not know the answer but can speculate. CBA is associated
with the administration of Ronald Reagan, who sought to deregulate
entire sectors of the economy and curtail regulation in others.23 Although CBA had been used in government before then, Reagan was
the first to institutionalize it-to require agencies to use it as a matter
of routine-and therefore CBA is associated with an anti-regulatory
mentality. It may well have been introduced by Reagan's OMB because he and other political leaders believed that most regulations do
not in fact pass the cost-benefit test or because CBA would introduce
bureaucratic hurdles that would at least slow down regulation.236
234 See Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 124-53 (cited in
note 9) (describing a process for laundering preferences).
235 See note 7 and accompanying text.
236 See Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 3-4 (cited in note 9)
(analyzing the political economy of CBA).
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Whatever they might have thought, many regulations since then have
passed the cost-benefit test.
Feasibility analysis, by contrast, has been understood to apply
when statutes forbid considerations of costs and benefits, and it would
therefore often seem to support strict regulations that are not clearly
cost-justified. As we have seen, however, the technological and economic feasibility conditions can be interpreted in quite a stringent
way, so as to bar regulation that CBA would permit. In their anxiety to
refute CBA, proponents of regulation have had to fall back on feasibility analysis as an alternative, but they have not realized that feasibility analysis might be no more favorable to regulation than CBA is.
Indeed, there is a possible public choice interpretation of feasibility analysis that is in tension with good-government premises: it may
reflect a political deal between industry, on the one hand, and environmental or labor groups, on the other. Industry receives protection
from regulations that greatly reduce profits; environmental and labor
groups obtain reductions in workplace accidents and environmental
pollution. The loser is the consumer, whose interests receive zero
weight. This pattern is reproduced in the dispute over the meaning of
feasibility itself. Most of the interpretations of this term-those emphasizing plant closures, lost revenues, lost profits, and firm bankruptcies-favor organized interests. Plant closures outrage communities
and their political representatives. Lost revenues and profits, and
bankruptcies, make businesses unhappy. Job loss that is spread across
industries receives no attention, just like consumer welfare, because
those affected are not politically organized.
Why then has industry shifted its support to CBA? One possibility is
that feasibility analysis in the hands of agencies proved so easily manipulated that the deal came unstuck. Agencies, staffed with people deeply
committed to their regulatory mission, went beyond the limits that feasibility analysis was supposed to impose-or so businesses might have believed.m Businesses threw their weight behind Ronald Reagan and supported CBA because at least that approach is more predictable. Or it
may be that Presidents -including Reagan's successors-are not as vulnerable to interest group pressure as Congress is, and so insisted on CBA
237

For this reason, some liberal scholars support CBA. See, for example, Sunstein, The

Cost-Benefit State at 6-10 (cited in note 9); Revesz and Livermore, Retaking Rationality at 9-12

(cited in note 9).
238 See, for example, Ackerman and Stewart, 37 Stan L Rev at 1335-37 (cited in note 12);
Hahn, 71 U Chi L Rev at 1028-29 (cited in note 9); Breyer, Regulation and its Reform at 32-42
(cited in note 15), and others who argue that much environmental regulation has been excessive
or excessively costly.
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because it would improve public welfare, possibly redounding to the electoral benefit of the President, rather than send rents to interest groups.
This would explain why the executive branch has championed CBA
across five administrations (both Democratic and Republican), while
Congress has wavered between the standards, ' influenced sometimes by
businesses and at other times by pro-regulatory groups.
A final point: it is possible to imagine conditions under which feasibility is both pro-regulatory in impact and desirable from a broad
social welfare standpoint, but these conditions are very unlikely to
exist. Suppose that agencies have "ideal points"-in the language of
political science-at the same place in the political spectrum that the
public has.m Agencies, in other words, are good agents for the public
interest. CBA, correctly performed, would put agencies in the same
location on the ideological spectrum. However, CBA is expensive and
crude24 and accordingly would create a drag on otherwise optimal
regulation. Perhaps in this case a weaker standard such as feasibility
would be preferable. But this argument for feasibility analysis is very
tricky. No standard at all would be better still if agencies act in the
public interest when unconstrained; the feasibility standard would be
desirable only if agencies tend to underestimate harm to workers and
overestimate costs to consumers, so that a direction to pay attention to
workers and ignore consumers would somehow balance out the agencies' natural inclinations and produce optimal incentives to regulate. If
this is the case for feasibility analysis -and it is the only one we can
think of-a great deal of empirical work would be necessary to prevail
over one's natural skepticism about the accuracy of these premises.
One could put this argument differently. If agencies are inclined
to underregulate, and CBA would only exacerbate this tendency because of the costs and hurdles it introduces, then it may well make
sense to refrain from requiring agencies to conduct CBA. But some
standard must be used. Feasibility analysis does not necessarily correct
for the deficiencies of CBA because it invites agencies to stop regulat239 See Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State at 10-16 (cited in note 9) (discussing the use of costbenefit balancing in both the executive branch and Congress since the 1980s, and noting that
Congress has alternated between several types of standards, including flat bans on consideration

of costs, feasibility requirements, and cost-benefit requirements).
240 See Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 103-A7 (cited in

note 9) (discussing the relationship between agencies, the executive branch, Congress, and the
courts, and the potential for principal-agent problems).
241 This is a frequent charge of critics. See, for example, Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit
State, 50 Admin L Rev 7, 13 (1998) (leveling this charge); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts
on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L J 1385,1413 (1992) (same).
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ing in order to avoid negative economic impacts. At the same time, it
encourages agencies to ignore other costs that matter. The most
straightforward solution to the problem of underregulation-if it is a
problem, which is far from clear-would be to fund and staff agencies
more generously and to invest in improvements in the practice of CBA.
CONCLUSION
We have discovered no reason for agencies to use feasibility
analysis, and, given its ambiguity and its unacceptable normative implications, we doubt that agencies actually allow it to guide their decisionmaking. Most likely, agencies engage in informal cost-benefit balancing while taking into account political constraints that exist because
of public (or congressional) hostility to plant closings, or they simply
strike a deal with employers and labor and environmental groups at the
expense of consumers. Whether feasibility analysis actually constrains
agencies or serves as a subterfuge for decisions arrived at on other
grounds, it has no place in regulatory decisionmaking.
Remedies are straightforward. Where statutes delegate agencies
policymaking authority, those agencies should exercise their power
under the Chevron doctrine to replace feasibility analysis with CBA
or another suitable decision procedure. OIRA should encourage
agencies to take this step; it might reasonably go so far as to forbid
agencies to use feasibility analysis to the extent permitted by law.
Courts should adopt a presumption that regulatory statutes do not
authorize feasibility analysis. Congress should refrain from incorporating the feasibility test in regulatory statutes, and should amend existing statutes so that they no longer do so.
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APPENDIX
TABLE Al: SELECTED FEASIBILITY-TRIGGERING STATUTES
Language (Emphasis Added)

US Code

Statute

"Feasible" Statutes
The Occupational
Safety and Health
Act of 1970

Federal Mine
Safety and Health
Act of 1977

requires conditions ... reasonably necessary or appropriate to

". ..

29 USC 5652(8)

provide.

29 USC
§ 655(b)(5)

... standards which most adequately assure on the basis of the best available
evidence that no miner will suffer material impairment...."
Additional considerations of "highest degree of health and safety" include
"the latest available scientific data ... the feasibility of the standards, and
experience gained under this and other health and safety laws."

§30 USC
11(a)(6)(A)

I "Maximum Available" Statutes

"Best Available"
Clean Air Act

..

the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible,
on the basis of the best available evidence. .. ."

...

42 USC

"...subject to the best available control technology for each pollutant...."

42USC§7479(3)

Defines BACT as" ... maximum degree of reduction ... taking into account
energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs ...

I 7475(a)(4)

- Prevention of

Significant Dete-

rioration Program
- National Ambient Air Quality
Standards
Clean Air Act

42 USC

... maximum degree of reduction [achievable] ... taking into consid-

I 7412(d)(2)

sn
Standards
-

Clean Air Act
- Standards of
Performance for
New Stationary
Sources

eration the cost of achieving such emission reduction.. .

"2... best system of emission reduction ... taking into account the
cost.. .and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and
energy requirements ... [that has been] adequately demonstrated."

42 U1

7411(a)(1)

envireflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse

33USC1326(b)

...

33 USC
§ 1311(b)(2)(A)(i)

...

I

...

13(U)C)(E)
33 USC

. . .

§ 1316(a)(1)

I

best available technology economically achievable ... which will
result in reasonable further progress. . . ."

Factors "shall" include "age of equipment and facilities involved, the
process employed, the engineering aspects of the application.. . process
changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, non-water quality
environment impact (including energy requirements), and such other
factors as the Administrator deems appropriate."

c
13 (U)()(B)

Clean Water Act

ronmental impact."

best conventional pollutant control technology.

greatest degree of effluent reduction ... achievable through ...

best available demonstrated control technology.. . ."
".. take into consideration the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, and

33 USC
1316(b)(1)(B)

any non-water quality, environmental impact and energy requirements."

"Reasonably Available" I "Best Practicable" Statutes
42 USC

Clean Air Act

"... through the adoption, at a minimum, of reasonably available
control technology .

§ 7502(c)(1)
(formerly
42 USC
§ 7502(b)(3))

33 USC
§ 1311(b)(1)(A)(i)
Clean Water Act

"
-

33 USC

§1314(b)(1)(B)

best practicable control technology currently available .

_____practicable___________control________________
...

"Factors... include consideration of the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved .... "
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TABLE A2: OSHA's ANALYSIS OF CHROMIUM
HIGH-IMPACT INDUSTRIES
Compliance
Industry

PeC

st aof
Revenue

Compliance
PesCtag of
Profits

Explanation of Deviation from Screening

Electroplating - General Industry
Specialty Trade Contractors
(NAICS 238)

Electroplating, Plating,
Polishing, Anodizing'
and Coloring Services
(NAICS 332813)

0.43%

11.14%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Industry sells service not product, so
overseas competition should not be
strong. Electroplating is "essential to the
manufacture of most plated products,"
implying that demand is unlikely to
decrease. Industry experienced and
survived profit variation of up to 49% in
single year. The 1.24% price increase is
"significantly less than the average annual
increase in price." Demand is inelastic
because plating is just a component of
product's total cost (less than 0.5%).

1.24%

30.15%

Wholesale Trade,
Durable Goods
(NAICS 423)

0.28%

11.01%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Motor Vehicle and
Parts Dealers
(NAICS 441)

0.23%

16.27%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Furniture and Home
Furnishing Stores
(NAICS 442)

0.66%

17.59%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Electronics and Appliance Stores
(NAICS 443)

0.50%

14.70%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Building Materials and
Garden Equipment and
Supplies Dealers
(NAICS 444)

0.55%

11.18%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Health and Personal
Care Stores
(NAICS 446)

0.44%

17.46%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Miscellaneous Store
Retailers
(NAICS 453)

0.71%

22.73%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Nonstore Retailers
(NAICS 454)

0.61%

16.01%

Only a few establishments reported use.

3.12%

35.01%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Information Services
and Data Processing
Service
(NAICS 519)
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Rental and Leasing
Services
(NAICS 532)

0.86%

34.20%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Professional, Scientific,
and Technical Services
(NAICS 541)

0.85%

13.52%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Administrative and
Support Services
(NAICES 561)

1.05%

27.60%

5.17%

54.93%

Only one establishment reported use;
possible mistake.

2.58%

49.92%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Performing Arts,
Spectator Sports, and
Related Industries
(NAICS 711)
Personal and Laundry
Services
(NAICS 812)

Not counted in the tally of thirty-one high
impact industries and no explanation
given. Likely only a few establishments
reported use.

Welding - General Industry (Stainless Steel)
Gasoline Stations
(NAICS 447)

0.22%

29.52%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Nursing and
Residential Care
(NAICS 623)

1.56%

30.07%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Social Assistance
(NAICS 624)

1.14%

22.34%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Food Services and
Drinking Places
(NAICS 722)

0.49%

11.93%

Only a few establishments reported use.

Repair and
Maintenance
(NAICS 811)

0.40%

10.49%

Given that it is a service industry, demand
for repairs should remain relatively
constant and foreign competition should
not pose a problem.

Personal and Laundry
Services
(NAICS 812)

0.67%

13.02%

Given that it is a service industry, demand
for repairs should remain relatively
constant and foreign competition should
not pose a problem.

3.91%

158.08%

Only one establishment reported use;

Religious, Grantmakind Civilar

possi

Organizations
(NAICS 813)

Welding - Construction Industry (Stainless Steel)

Building, Developing,
and General Contracting; Heavy Construction; Special Trade
Contractors
(NAICS 233,234,235)

0.92%

22.33%

Passing costs on would only increase price
0.92% and steel prices have varied more
than 10% a year without affecting the
industry.
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Welding - General Industry (Carbon Steel)
Religious, Grantmaking, Civil, Professional
and Similar Organiza-

1n00
1.00%

4
%
4034

0
etblishment reported use;
onlyioe eistablsentrprtdue

tions

(NAICS 813)
Painting - General Industry
Motor Vehicle Body
and Trailer
Manufacturing
(NAICS 3362)

Merely part of manufacturing process, so
the actual cost is insignificant in terms of
the final product price and should be
largely passed on.

Military Armored
Vehicle, Tank, and
Tank Component
Manufacturers
(NAICS 336992)

Merely part of manufacturing process, so
the actual cost is insignificant in terms of
the final product price and should be
largely passed on.

Used Car Dealers
(NAICS 44112)

0.25%

10.14%

0.41%

33.66%

Automotive Body'
Paint, and Interior

Cr(VI) alternatives already exist, the use
of Cr(VI) is only a small portion of the
actual business, and demand is probably
fairly inelastic.
Cr(VI) alternatives are already developed, the use of Cr(VI) is only a small
portion of the actual business, and demand is probably fairly inelastic.

Maintenance
(NAICS 811121)

Chromlum Catalyst Producers
All Other Basic Inorganic Chemical
Manufacturers
(NAICS 325188)

0.80%

27.14%

Short-term demand is relatively inelastic
since most companies would need major
new investments to shift away from
CR(VI) catalysts.

Iron and Steel Foundries
Iron Foundries; Steel
Investment Foundries;
Steel Foundries
(Except Investment)
(NAICS 3315, 331512,
331513)

0.42%

15.30%

Monitoring costs make up 44% of estimated compliance costs, but such costs
could be reduced to less than 10% of
profits if performance-based monitoring is
used instead of scheduled periodic monitoring. Industry has absorbed 32% increase in price of steel over past two years
and survived.

Chromium Catalyst Users - Service Companies
Other Services to
Buildings and Dwell
, Includ g
Catalyst Handling
(NAICS 325110)

0.44%

11.59%

Demand should remain constant since
companies are more likely to turn to
service companies when regulation is
increased.

Source: 71 Fed Reg at 10272-80 table VIII-7 (cited in note 63) (data); 71 Fed Reg at 10300-02 (cited in
note 63) (explanation).

